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THE PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST




Inventories in this country constitute a major source of potential
financing capital. The total value of manufacturing and trade inven-
tories in this country amounts to almost three quarters of a trillion
dollars.' The total outstanding amount of commercial loans is meas-
ured in the hundreds of billions of dollars.2 Specifically, purchase
money financing of inventories, in reliance on the priority accorded
purchase money security interests under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC),3 alone amounts to billions of dollars
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho, College of Law. Cop-
yright 1989, All Rights Reserved.
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1. As of December 31, 1988, the total book value of manufacturing and
trade inventories in the United States amounted to $743,191,000,000. U.S. Dep't of
Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Business Statistics: 1961-1988. Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, December 1989, at 9. [hereinafter Business
Statistics].
2. As of December 31, 1988, the total outstanding amount of commercial
and industrial loans made by large commercial banks reporting weekly to the Federal
Reserve System amounted to $301,013,000,000. Id. at 64. The statistics relating to
commercial loans do not distinguish between secured and unsecured loans, or the
types of collateral, if any, involved. The amounts set forth relating to inventories
and loans are merely provided to demonstrate the scope of the economic activity
relating to inventories and commercial loans. The numbers are not intended as direct
correlations of the amount of secured credit advanced on the security of inventories.
For additional data concerning the scope of secured lending, see Scott, A Relational
Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 938-940, app. at 971-977
(1986).
3. Unless otherwise noted, all references to the "Uniform Commercial
Code," "UCC" or "Code" are to the 1987 Official Text. References to "Article
9" are to Article 9 of the Code.
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annually. 4 Given the magnitude of purchase money secured credit
advanced against inventory, the provisions of Article 9 relating to
purchase money security interests must be interpreted and applied
properly to facilitate this important economic activity.
Article 9 has succeeded, as a general proposition, in providing a
uniform and smoothly functioning system for securing commercial
credit. This unified system of securing credit has perhaps no greater
significance than in the area of inventory financing. Through the
validation of the "floating lien" 5 and the related exception for the
purchase money security interest (PMSI), 6 Article 9 has made the
vast inventories of business more easily and readily available as a
source of credit.7 Despite the current debate about whether a system
of secured credit constitutes the most efficient means for obtaining
and extending credit,' Article 9 facilitates the provision of working
4. Affidavit of Richard C. Goldman, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, ITT Commercial Finance Corp. [hereinafter Goldman Affidavit]; Affidavit
of Richard W. Moyer, Vice President and Associate General Counsel, BancAmerica
Private Brands Inc. [hereinafter Moyer Affidavit]; and Affidavit of George V.
Burbach, Associate Counsel, Ford Motor Credit Company [hereinafter Burbach
Affidavit]; Southtrust Bank of Ala., Nat'l Ass'n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp.,
760 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 774 F.2d 1179 (1985) (Petition for
Rehearing by Panel and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc). Mr. Goldman stated
that ITT Commercial Finance Corp. had outstanding purchase money loans in the
amount of $1,100,000,000, Mr. Moyer stated that BancAmerica Private Brands had
outstanding purchase money loans in the amount of $688,492,000, and Mr. Burbach
stated that Ford Motor Credit had outstanding purchase money inventory loans in
the amount of $5.3 billion. In their affidavits, Messrs. Goldman, Moyer and Burbach
each indicated that the documentation for such financing included after-acquired
property clauses and future advance clauses, which they believed were effective and
would not jeopardize the priority accorded their purchase money security interests
under the Code.
5. As used in this Article, the terms "floating lien" and "floating charge"
mean that security interest obtained in after-acquired property, and as security for
future advances, by virtue of the operation of §§ 9-204, 9-205 and 9-108 of the
UCC.
6. See infra text accompanying note 77.
7. See supra notes 1-2; see also infra note 9; Memorandum of Mr. Robert
W. Weeks, Submitted on Behalf of the John Deere Plow Company, December 23,
1954, reprinted in 2 N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n 1954 Report, Legis. Doc.
65H, Item 20, 61 (1954) [hereinafter Weeks Memo]. Mr. Weeks concluded that
Article 9 "provides for a floating lien in the inventory field, available wherever it
can be useful, without eliminating other methods of obtaining security. By doing
so, it makes many new types of inventory usable as collateral, provides a more
adaptable security device, makes possible the elimination of expensive paper work
and eliminates some otherwise unavoidable risks peculiar to inventory financing."
Id. at 71.
8. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy
Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); Levmore,
Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49
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capital and acquisition financing in a manner that permits the ex-
pansion of capital in business. 9
Through the combination of a unitary device, the "security
interest", and the validation of the floating lien, Article 9 permits
lenders to obtain security in the inventory of the borrower simply,
at relatively low cost, and without the necessity of extensive, technical
and burdensome on-going monitoring and paper work for purposes
of maintaining priority. 0 The creation of a single form of consensual
lien" simplified the task of obtaining security by eliminating the
overly technical distinctions between the various forms of chattel
security that existed prior to the Code. 2 Equally important to the
financing of inventory, the Code validated the floating lien. 3 Unlike
equipment and consumer goods that the borrower generally retains
during the life of the financing, the borrower buys, sells and replen-
ishes inventory in the ordinary course of business. This posed great
difficulties under pre-Code chattel security law because of the re-
quirement that the creditor retain significant controls over its collat-
eral in order to maintain its security."4 Such controls required technical
and burdensome monitoring in order to satisfy the creditor's need
for security while at the same time permitting the debtor the necessary
freedom to carry on business. 5 Though complicated and difficult, it
was possible to accommodate the business needs of the debtor and
the security needs of the creditor under pre-Code chattel security
laws.1
6
(1982); White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND.
L. REV. 473 (1984); Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND.
L. REV. 1051 (1984); Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Effi-
ciency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1985);
Jackson & Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A Reply to Professor
Kripke, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 987 (1985); and Scott, supra note 2.
9. There has been a clear, steady increase in manufacturing and trade
inventories over the past twenty years. See Business Statistics, supra note 1, at 9.
Although numerous factors contributed to this expansion, it is reasonable to believe
that the availability of a relatively simple and inexpensive system of secured credit
was not an insignificant factor in such expansion. See Scott, supra note 2, at 938-
39 and 943-44.
10. See Weeks Memo, supra note 7. This is not to say that, in the context
of purchase money inventory financing, there are no legal requirements for the
tracing of collateral and debts. See infra notes 82, 289-92 and accompanying text.
However, the legal as opposed to the business requirements of monitoring and
tracing have been kept to the minimum necessary to protect the competing interests
of the secured creditor, other creditors and the debtor. See infra notes 170, 303-12
and accompanying text.
11. A consensual lien is a lien existing by mutual consent without a formal
writing. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (5th ed. 1979).
12. See infra Part IV. B.l. See also UCC § 9-101, comment (1987).
13. See infra Part IV.B.I.b.
14. See infra Part IV.B.I.
15. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
1990]
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Validation of the floating lien was a natural development that
the drafters believed simply gave effect to a state of affairs that
existed under pre-Code law.' 7 Notwithstanding the drafters' views,
the validation of the floating lien met significant opposition. 8 Perhaps
the single greatest source of comment and concern during the drafting
and adoptive history of Article 9 related to this development, which
many considered to be revolutionary. 9 The possibility that a prior
secured creditor, through the utilization of the floating lien, could
obtain a stranglehold on a debtor, precluding the acquisition of
alternate financing, particularly concerned some critics.20 The draft-
ers, however, provided the debtor with an escape mechanism from
this dilemma through the use of the PMSI and the numerous privi-
leges accorded it.21 Principal among the privileges accorded the PMSI
17. UCC § 9-204, comment 2 (1987); see also infra note 137 and accompa-
nying text.
18. Statement of the National Commercial Finance Conference, Inc. and the
Association of Commercial Discount Companies, Inc. on the Uniform Commercial
Code [hereinafter Statement of the National Commercial Finance Conference],
reprinted in N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of Uniform Commercial Code:
Memoranda Presented to the Commission and Stenographic Report of Public
Hearing on Article 9 of the Code, Legis. Doc. 65(H), 2 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n
1954 Report 1025, 1032-1036 (1954). See also infra note 67.
19. "This aspect of Article 9 [the floating lien] is its most controversial
feature." 1 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 359 (1965). See,
2 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n 1954 Report 1054-57 (1954) (exchange of correspon-
dence between H.F. Birnbaum and Milton P. Kupfer); 2 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n
1954 Report 1086 (1954) (Statement of Major Policy Questions to be Developed at
Public Hearing, Major Policy No. 2); 2 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n 1954 Report
1092-1211 (1954) (Stenographic Report of Hearing on Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, at 1098 (Comments of Harold M. Sherman), at 1143-1166,
passim, (Comments of Milton Kupfer), at 1180-1183 (Comments of Grant Gilmore),
at 1192-1194 (Comments of J. Francis Ireton)).
20. "Would not the operation of the general lien [floating charge] necessarily
throttle such competition [among providers of credit] by the blanketing or freezing
of the borrower's credit position?" Statement of the National Commercial Finance
Conference, supra note 8, 2 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n 1954 Report, at 1034. See
also, 2 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n 1954 Report 1054 (1954) (Correspondence of
H. F. Birnbaum to John W. MacDonald); 2 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n 1954
Report 1092-1211 (1954) (Stenographic Report of Hearing on Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, at 1098 (Comments of Harold Sherman), at 1150-1151
(Comments of Milton Kupfer), at 1193 (Comments of J. Francis Ireton)).
21. See, Gilmore, Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1333-37 (1963).
Special protections accorded the PMSI include (1) exemption from Article 9 filing
requirements to perfect a PMSI in consumer goods under UCC § 9-302; (2) grace
periods for the filing of UCC financing statements in order to perfect the PMSI
under 9-302 (consumer goods) and 9-312(4) (non-inventory collateral); (3) protection
from the avoidance power of a bankruptcy trustee under Bankruptcy Code § 522(0;
and (4) most importantly for the purposes of this article, the priority accorded the
PMSI over prior, perfected security interests in after-acquired property of the debtor
under UCC §§ 9-312(3) and 9-312(4). See Aronov, The Transformation Rule Applied
to Purchase Money Security Interests in Commercial Lending Transactions, 16 MEM.
ST. U.L. REV. 15, 18-19 (1985).
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is the priority over earlier security interests in after-acquired prop-
erty.
22
Casual observation of the operation of secured lending today
indicates that the fear that validation of the floating lien would
eliminate alternate sources of credit has not materialized. 23 Certainly
the existence of the purchase money priority serves to expand the
debtor's available sources of credit, as the drafters intended. 24 It is
significant that since the adoption of the Code, litigation challenging
the priority of the properly perfected PMSI has been rare. Only a
few cases have dealt directly with the specific issue of competing
priority in the same inventory collateral between the properly per-
fected PMSI in inventory25 versus the properly perfected security
interest in after-acquired property. 26 The overwhelming majority of
22. See UCC § 9-312(3) (1987). See also, 2 G. GILMoRE, Security Interests in
Personal Property § 29.1, at 777-78 (1965).
23. See supra note 4. See also 14 West's Legal Forms § 57.3, Form 17 (2d
ed. 1985).
24. As Professor Gilmore stated, "No previous security statute has so warmly
embraced the once-despised after-acquired property interest. It is also true that no
previous statute has so sternly insisted on the priority for purchase money interests."
Gilmore, supra note 21, at 1334; see also In re Daniels, 35 Bankr. 247, 249 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1983) where the Court stated:
The drafters of the Code realized the impact upon commercial flow which
would result should a debtor be strangled by a prior secured creditor. Such
a creditor by not providing additional funds could cripple a debtor's
commercial operation. The debtor, on the other hand, would be hamstrung
in receiving other financing since another creditor would have no collateral
protection. The purchase money security interest rescued the debtor from
this commercial impasse.
25. As used in this Article, a "properly perfected purchase money security
interest in inventory" means a PMSI in inventory with respect to which all of the
requirements of UCC § 9-312(3), see infra note 92, have been duly and timely
fulfilled, to-wit, prior to the receipt of possession of the intended collateral by the
borrower, the purchase money party has properly perfected (usually by filing) its
interest in the collateral, and duly notified all other parties having an interest in the
same type of collateral of the purchase money party's acquisition of a PMSI.
26. See, Fedders Fin. Corp. v. Chiarelli Bros., 221 Pa. Super. 224, 289 A.2d
169 (1972), aff'g Fedders Fin. Corp. v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Pa., 63
Berks Co. L.J. 170, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 894 (Pa. C.P. 1971) (purchase
money priority upheld in face of claim by general financier claiming under after-
acquired property clause); In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co., Inc., 26 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 203 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979) (same); In Re Beverage, 30 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 369 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1980) (same); Kings Appliance &
Elec., Inc. v. Citizens & Southern Bank of Dublin, 157 Ga. App. 857, 278 S.E. 2d
733 (1981) (purchase money financier granted priority over prior financier claiming
under after-acquired property clause with respect to inventory received by debtor
after perfection and notification by purchase money financier under § 9-312(3)).
Summary judgment reversed and remanded for determination of the date of the
first shipment of inventory received by debtor from purchase money claimant);
Southtrust Bank of Alabama, Nat'l Ass'n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760
1990]
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cases involving conflicts between purchase money financiers and
general financiers involve the issue of the purchase money financier's
compliance with the technical requirements of UCC section 9-312(3)
and (4).27 That secured parties themselves understand that the Code
grants the purchase money financier priority in all collateral which
its credit enabled the debtor to acquire, provides one explanation for
the dearth of case law on the direct priority battle.
28
The fact that, for many businesses, inventory is the single largest
asset 29 demonstrates the necessity for a floating lien. Unless a lender's
security interest can float over the fluctuating pool of inventory, the
F.2d 1240 (11th Cir, 1985), reh'g denied mem., 774 F.2d 1179 (1985) (general
financier claiming under after-acquired property clause granted priority over properly
perfected PMSI in same inventory); In Re Southern Vermont Supply, Inc., 58 Bankr.
887 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986) (purchase money secured party granted priority over
general financier claiming under after-acquired property clause and over Debtor's
trustee in bankruptcy).
27. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Japulpa v. National Cash
Register Co., 473 P.2d 234 (Oki. 1970) (timeliness of perfection under § 9-312(4));
Sunshine v. Sunray Floor Covering Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 780, 315 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup.
Ct. 1970) (same); Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Penning's Sales, Inc., 5 Wash.
App. 501, 487 P.2d 1053 (1971) (failure to comply with notice provisions of § 9-
312(3)); In re Automated Bookbinding Services, Inc., 471 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1972)
(timing of debtor's possession under § 9-312(4)); In re Ultra Precision Industries,
Inc., 503 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1974) (same); Steego Auto Parts Corp. v. Markey, 2
Ohio App. 3d 200, 441 N.E.2d 279 (1981) (purchase money financer of inventory
failed to give requisite notice to prior secured parties); Bigelow-Sanford, Inc. v.
Security-Peoples Trust Co., 304 Pa. Super. 167, 450 A.2d 154 (1982) (purchase
money financier failed to notify prior secured party); Taylor Rental Corp. v. First
Citizens Bank, 539 F.Supp. 228 (D. Mont. 1983) (failure to comply with requirements
of § 9-312(3)); In Re Steigerwald, 35 Bankr. 254 (Bankr. Pa. 1983) (sufficiency of
notice); In Re Daniels, 35 Bankr. 247 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (same); Matter of
Pinnelas-Pasco Wholesale Tire Co., Inc., 36 Bankr. 559 (Bankr. C.D. Fla. 1983)
(failure to timely perfect and inadequacy of notice); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. First
State Bank of Smithville, 679 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1984) (failure to give prior creditors
notice).
28. Professor Hansford has suggested that the lack of litigation in this area
results from the fact that (1) "[mjost major inventory financiers probably have
priority because they are first to perfect;" or (2) the subsequent inventory financier
obtains a subordination agreement from the prior lender; or (3) "very few lenders
ever truly rely upon their purchase money status for priority." Hansford, The
Purchase Money Security Interest in Inventory Versus the After-Acquired Property
Interest-A "No-Win" Situation, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 235, 261 (1986). Whether
"most" inventory financiers gain priority by perfecting first or obtaining subordi-
nation agreements must await further empirical study. However, Hansford's conten-
tion that "very few lenders ever truly rely" on purchase money priority is belied
by the Goldman Affidavit, Moyer Affidavit and Burbach Affidavit, supra note 4,
wherein each affihnt stated that they entered into purchase money financing trans-
actions in reliance on the priority accorded purchase money security interests under
the Code, including priority accorded to future purchase money obligations and
after-acquired purchase money collateral.
29. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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lender's ability to conduct on-going inventory financing is severely
restricted. At the same time, the existence of the floating lien, in the
hands of the general financier, does pose a threat to the debtor's
ability to obtain alternate financing. Yet, with the PMSI priority
coupled with the floating lien, the debtor can retain flexibility in
financing its inventory as the drafters intended.
The following hypothetical will serve to illustrate the proper
construction of the floating lien in the context of the PMSI in
inventory. Borrower desires to open an automobile parts store to sell
all manner of automobile parts, from tires and batteries to gaskets,
hoses, and belts. Borrower negotiates and enters into a standard
working capital financing arrangement with a local Bank.30 To secure
a line of credit of $500,000, Bank acquires and duly perfects a
blanket security interest in all of Borrower's equipment, inventory
and accounts, then owned and thereafter acquired. Borrower opens
the auto parts store and for three years Borrower's business grows
and the relationship with Bank is mutually beneficial.3 ' After three
years, however, Borrower finds it desirable to take advantage of
other financing opportunities. Borrower may desire to expand the
lines of merchandise offered. It may be that Bank does not believe
that the Borrower's market can support such expansion.3 2 In another
case, Borrower may wish to expand into new lines of inventory
because Suppliers33 offer to extend more favorable financing on the
new merchandise.3 4 This may result from the Suppliers' expertise in
monitoring this type of collateral, or because of the ready market
available to Supplier to sell the inventory in the event of a default.
For whatever reason, Borrower wishes to obtain inventory financing
from sources other than the Bank, although it is content with respect
to the general working capital arrangements with the Bank. On the
other hand, the Bank is not willing to extend the necessary additional
credit or meet the more favorable terms available to Borrower from
other sources.
The Code permits the Borrower to grant Supplier a PMSI in the
inventory provided by Supplier.35 So long as the advances, loans or
other credit advanced by Supplier result in Borrower's acquisition of
30. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
31. Bank supplies the financing as well as significant financial and investment
counseling to get Borrower's business off to a solid start. See infra notes 265-72
and accompanying text.
32. The new project (inventory expansion) represents a risk Bank did not
contemplate. See infra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
33. For purposes of this hypothetical, the purchase money party is referred
to as "Supplier." Such "Supplier" may be a seller of goods or a third-party
financier. See infra notes 286-87.
34. See infra notes 286-87, and accompanying text.
35. See UCC § 9-107 (1987) and comment 1.
1990]
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inventory (such advances, loans or other credit being referred to as
"purchase money obligations"), Supplier will retain priority in all
inventory so acquired ("purchase money collateral") to secure all
purchase money obligations.3 6 The ability to secure all outstanding
purchase money obligations with the fluctuating pool of purchase
money collateral recognizes the nature of inventory finance as an on-
going relationship, as well as the difficulty of structuring inventory
financing on a self-liquidating basis. It is the validation of the floating
lien in the purchase money context that makes inventory financing
possible. Indeed, if the floating lien is not available to the purchase
money financier of inventory, the PMSI in inventory is a dead letter
for all practical purposes.
The PMSI in inventory, if not dead, is in critical condition in
the United States Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit where one
recent case held that the floating lien is unavailable to, and incon-
sistent with, a PMSI in inventory.37 This Article will demonstrate
that such a construction of the PMSI is wholly inconsistent with the
purpose, policy and history of the Code. Indeed, only by giving
effect to the floating lien in the context of PMSIs in inventory can
the scheme and purpose of the Code be realized to the benefit of
the debtor, general financier and purchase money financier.
Part II of this Article will discuss the current assault on the
purchase money security interest in the context of inventory financing.
Part III will demonstrate that the current text and comment of the
Code do not support invalidation of the floating lien in the context
of the PMSI in inventory. In Part IV of this Article, pre-Code legal
developments and the drafting and legislative histories of the Code
will be analyzed to establish the clear, strong preference the drafters
accorded to so-called "new value" given to a borrower. This pref-
erence, manifested both in the common law on the eve of the drafting
of the Code, and in the first drafts of what was to become Article
9,38 clearly illustrates that limitations placed on the scope of the
PMSI in inventory (by precluding the efficacy of the floating lien),
based solely on the definition of PMSI in UCC section 9-107, are
without foundation. Part IV of the Article will conclude that under
36. See UCC § 9-312(3) (1987).
37. Southtrust Bank of Ala, Nat'l Ass'n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp.,
760 F.2d 1240, 1243 (11th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied mem., 774 F.2d 1179 (1985).
See infra note 44.
38. The Article of the Code on Secured Transactions was designated as
Article VII in the initial Tentative Drafts and in the May, 1949 Draft. Kelly, Uniform
Commercial Code Drafts, Vols. 4,5 and 8 (1984) [hereinafter Kelly, Drafts]. The
September, 1949 Revisions to the May, 1949 Draft designated the Article on Secured
Transactions as Article VIII. Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 8. Beginning with the Proposed
Final Draft, Spring, 1950, the Article on Secured Transactions has been designated
as Article 9. Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 11.
[Vol. 57
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a purposive analysis of the present Code and its historical antecedents,
the PMSI in inventory must be accorded the benefits of the floating
lien in order to effectuate the purposes of preferring "new value"
additions to the borrower's estate. In Part V, it will be argued that
equity and fairness require that the PMSI in inventory be accorded
broad priority vis-a-vis the prior financier claiming under an after-
acquired property clause. Further, without entering directly into the
current debate concerning whether secured credit is efficient or not,
it will be shown that the floating lien in the context of PMSIs in
inventory is entirely consistent with Professor Scott's Relational
Theory of Secured Financing.39 Finally, using the foregoing hypo-
thetical as a model, Part VI will set forth the limits and bounds of
the PMSI in inventory.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
A purchase money security interest under Article 940 constitutes
an exception to the Code's general rule of priority among competing
security interests, i.e., first in time.4' The holder of a PMSI in certain
collateral obtains priority with respect to that collateral even though
such collateral is subject to an earlier perfected security interest.
42
Further, the PMSI is also accorded special protection in bankruptcy 3.4
Notwithstanding the special priority and other protections afforded
the PMSI under the UCC and the Bankruptcy Code, a judicial bias
against the PMSI has manifested itself, culminating in the develop-
ment of the so-called "transformation rule." 44 The transformation
39. Scott, supra note 2.
40. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1987).
41. See U.C.C §§ 9-312(5), 9-312(3) and 9-312(4) (1987).
42. Id.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1987) (allowing the debtor to avoid non-possessory,
non-purchase money security interests in certain exempt assets) (unless otherwise
noted, all references to the "Bankruptcy Code" are to the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982), as amended (Supp. 1987)) (§§ 101-1501
to 151326 were repealed).
44. See In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1966); In re Manuel, 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Matthews, 724 F.2d
798 (9th Cir. 1984); Schneider v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank (In re Schneider), 37 Bankr.
747 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984). See also Aronov, supra note 21, at 22-23; Lloyd,
Refinancing Purchase Money Security Interests, 53 TENm. L. REv. 1, 48-54 (1985).
While the purpose of this Article is to set forth the proper interpretation and scope
of the floating lien and purchase money security interest in the inventory context,
the impetus for this Article came from the 1985 decision of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Southtrust Bank of Ala., Nat'l Ass'n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance
Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, reh'g denied, 774 F.2d 1179 (lth Cir. 1985). In Southtrust,
the court, interpreting Alabama and Georgia law under the UCC, applied the
"transformation rule" to deprive a purchase money inventory financier of priority
over a prior perfected lender claiming under an after-acquired property clause. The
1990]
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rule provides that a purchase money security interest in collateral
may be "transformed" into a nonpurchase money security interest
if the collateral secures payment of indebtedness or liabilities other
than the purchase price of the specific item of collateral and/or the,
creditor attempts to secure the payment of the purchase price with
property other than the specific item of collateral.4 1 Upon application
of the transformation rule, the PMSI loses all of the special protec-
tions afforded PMSIs6 and becomes a standard, general security
interest. Of particular importance to the present discussion, the
purchase money financier loses priority in all purchase money col-
lateral when courts invoke the transformation rule.
4 7
The transformation rule has been developed and applied almost
exclusively in the area of consumer bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy
Code.48 Application of the transformation rule in the consumer
bankruptcy area may be justified, given the distinctions made by the
UCC between consumer goods, inventory, and equipment,4 9 and the
court held that "a floating lien is inconsistent with a PMSI" and ruled that the
failure of the purchase money financier to establish "a one-to-one relationship
between the debt and the collateral" resulted in the loss of purchase money priority
under the UCC. Id. at 1243. This decision effectively destroys the UCC provisions
according purchase money financiers priority, particularly in the inventory context.
See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
45. Schneider v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank (In re Schneider), 37 Bankr. 747, 749
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984).
46. See supra note 21; Aronov, supra note 21, at 22; Lloyd, supra note 44,
at 2-4.
47. Southtrust, 760 F.2d at 1243.
48. See supra note 44. Also see the cases cited in Stilson, The "Overloaded"
PMSI in Bankruptcy: A Problem in Search of Resolution, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 1 nn. 1
& 2, 2 n.4 (1987); Aronov, supra note 21, at 23.
49. UCC § 9-109 defines consumer goods, equipment and inventory as
follows:
Goods are
(1) "consumer goods" if they are used or bought for use primarily
for personal, family or household purposes;
(2) "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily in
business (including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-
profit organization or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods
are not included in the definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer
goods;
(4) "inventory" if they are held by a person who holds them for sale
or lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he has so
furnished them, or if they are raw materials, work in process or materials
used or consumed in a business. Inventory of a person is not to be classified
as his equipment.
Comment 2 to § 9-109 states, "The classes of goods are mutually exclusive; the
same property cannot at the same time and as to the same person be both equipment
and inventory, for example." The classification of goods into mutually exclusive
categories is a fundamental organizing feature of the Code. The purpose of such
1990] PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY
UCC's specific rules relating to the treatment of security interests in
different types of collateral based on the function of such collateral.50
Further justification for application of the transformation rule in the
context of consumer bankruptcy may be found in the policies of the
Bankruptcy Code to protect the consumer debtor.5" Such policy
justifications do not exist in a commercial context. 2 In the commer-
cial context, different policies must be advanced that demonstrate
the impropriety of the transformation rule."
mutually exclusive categories was to allow development of specific rules addressing
the particular needs and functions of such forms of collateral in commercial practice.
See infra Part IV.B.I.a.
50. See UCC §§ 9-301 to -318 (1987).
51. Among the policy rationales for application of the transformation rule
in the consumer and bankruptcy contexts are: (1) protection of the filing system of
the Code, arising by virtue of the Code's automatic perfection of a security interest
in consumer goods, without filing, under U.C.C. § 9-302(d). See Hansford, supra
note 28, at 249. (2) Penalizing creditor overreaching and unconscionable actions
such as occurred in Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Dir. 1965), where the creditor attempted to secure consumer credit with all consumer
purchases until the entire indebtedness was satisfied. See Stilson, supra note 48, at
12 see also Bankruptcy Code § 522(0; Hansford, supra note 28, at 254; Stilson,
supra note 48, at 23; and Aronov, supra note 21, at 41. (3) The fresh start policies
underlying the Bankruptcy Code. See Stilson, supra note 48, at 28 and Aronov,
supra note 21, at 41.
52. While this author believes that the transformation rule is not justified in
any context, by virtue of the "to the extent" language in U.C.C. § 9-107, see
Lloyd, supra note 44, at 63-67; and Aronov, supra note 21, at 42, it is possible to
justify its application in the context of consumer bankruptcy under one or more of
the above policies, particularly policies derived from the Bankruptcy Code. "[T]he
policies of the U.C.C are arguably supplanted by those of the [Bankruptcy Code]
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution." Stilson, supra note
48, at 35. However, the Bankruptcy Code lacks any provision parallel to § 522(f)
for the avoiding of non-purchase money security interests in commercial forms of
collateral (e.g., equipment and inventory), and the policies of the UCC and the
Bankruptcy Code to protect consumers are not present in the commercial context.
See infra note 53. Finally, the Code's policy of debtor protection is fundamentally
different in the consumer and commercial contexts. See, infra note 56.
It is not the purpose of this article to demonstrate the improprieties of the
transformation rule per se. For such scholarship, see the articles by Hansford,
Aronov, Stilson and Lloyd supra, respectively, at notes 28, 21, 48 and 44. The true
purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the UCC and its provisions concerning
PMSIs in inventory and the floating lien, if construed in light of all the policies
and purposes of the Code, address the needs, and adequately protect the interests,
of the debtor, the general financier and the purchase money financier, making the
strict, hypertechnical tracing requirements of the transformation rule, as adopted by
the court in Southtrust, wholly inappropriate and unnecessary. See supra note 44.
53. UCC § 1-102 sets forth the general policies of the Code in the context
of commercial finance. The Code is to be liberally interpreted to foster its policies.
UCC § 1-102(1) (1987). While protections for the debtor, creditors and purchasers
must be balanced, the drafters of the Code recognized that these protections are
not of equal importance in every context. See infra Part IV.B.I.a.; Kawasho Int'l,
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The UCC policies of advancing commercial practice, keeping
commercial law modern and consistent with commercial reality, and
promoting uniformity 4 must be considered in any discussion of the
proper interpretation of UCC provisions. In order to construe specific
provisions of the Code in accordance with these overriding policy
considerations, the context in which the specific provisions are to be
applied becomes very significant. Simply because the transformation
rule may be justified in one situation," it cannot be taken as carte
blanche to apply the transformation rule in every situation involving
a PMSI. Indeed, the same policy considerations which indicate that
the transformation rule may be appropriate in one situation, for
example, consumer finance, may indicate the total impropriety of
the transformation rule in another setting, like inventory finance.
5 6
Analysis of the pertinent provisions of the Code in the context of
commercial inventory finance, demonstrates the Code's method and
framework for the proper scope and application of the floating lien
and the PMSI in inventory.
The rise of the transformation rule has not gone unnoticed;
57
however, the case law and the commentary dealing with the permis-
sible scope of the PMSI in inventory focus principally on the defi-
nition in section 9-107, without detailed analysis of the floating lien
provisions as applied to the PMSI. Consideration of the PMSI
together with the floating lien provides insight into the "patent
Inc. v. Alper (In Re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.), Inc., 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 203, 208 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (recognizing distinction between consumer and
commercial context). Indeed, the same concern for protection of the debtor, which
in the consumer context gave rise to the transformation rule and the narrow
construction of the PMSI, will be shown to require a broad construction for the
operation of the PMSI in inventory. See infra note 56 and Part VI. It is significant
to note that the drafters' early intention was to include consumer protections in the
UCC, but such consumer protections were eliminated to a large extent as not within
the general scheme of Article 9. See Barnes, Toward a Normative Framework for
the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 TEM. L.R. 117, 145-57 (1989).
54. UCC § 1-102 (1987).
55. See note 51 supra.
56. For example, in the consumer context the policy of debtor protection
may support application of the transformation rule to prevent creditor overreaching,
while in the context of inventory finance it supports a broad validation of the PMSI,
including the validation of the floating lien, to avoid overreaching and creditor
misbehavior by the prior secured lender relying on the after-acquired property clause.
See infra notes 277-84 and accompanying text; Scott, supra note 2, at 962-963; In
re Daniels, 35 Bankr. 247 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (explanatory comment supra
note 24).
57. See Aronov, supra note 21; Hansford, supra note 28; Stilson, supra note
48; Lloyd, supra note 44; McLaughlin, "Add on" Clauses in Equipment Purchase
Money Financing: Too Much of a Good Thing, 49 FoRDH" L. Rnv. 661 (1981);
Note, Preserving the Purchase Money Status of Refinanced or Commingled Purchase
Money Debt, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1133 (1983); Note, Preserving Purchase Money
Security Interests and Allocating Payments, 20 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 849 (1987).
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reason""8 underlying the purchase money provision.5 9 To properly
interpret the Code provisions dealing with PMSI in inventory it is
necessary to construe "individual provisions holistically, that is, as
part of a Code."' 6 Accordingly, while the definition of PMSI in
section 9-107 is certainly relevant to a discussion of the proper scope
of the PMSI in inventory, appreciation of the intended scope and
benefit to be accorded purchase money obligations and security
interests requires consideration of (1) the general purposes and pol-
icies of the Code set forth in section 1-102; (2) supplemental principles
of law, particularly equity, under section 1-103, which inform the
proper construction of specific Code provisions; (3) the floating lien
provisions of the Code in section 9-204 concerning the validation of
after-acquired and future advance clauses and section 9-205 concern-
ing the level of monitoring of collateral to preserve priority; and (4)
section 9-312(3), and its relation to section 9-109 on classification of
collateral, concerning the requirements for, and purposes of, the
priority accorded to PMSIs in inventory.
Existing scholarship provides advice for avoiding the effects of
the transformation rule, 6' suggests legislative corrections for the ef-
fects of the rule,62 and urges the courts to deal with the allocation
of payments in a more flexible manner to give effect to PMSIs.
63
Such analyses and advice, while properly critical of the transforma-
tion rule, fail to address the proper construction of the Code itself.
Rather, in those situations where a purchase money financier restricts
58. See infra notes 100 and 144 (regarding Karl Llewellyn's principle of the
patent reason).
59. Professor Lloyd has gone beyond the bare definition of a PMSI in section
9-107 and demonstrates the early bias and judicial favor in protecting the priority
accorded it. Lloyd, supra note 44 at 10-37. See infra notes 140-42, 202 and 207-08
and accompanying text.
60. Barnes, supra note 53, at 118.
61. See, e.g., Aronov, supra note 21, at 59-63. The author suggests that the
purchase money financier assure priority by obtaining lien subordination agreements
from prior secured parties. Id. Ms. Aronov further suggests that through a properly
drafted subordination agreement, "allocations [of collateral between the secured
parties] might be done in more general terms by simply giving each creditor priority
to that collateral specifically financed by each of them." Id. at 63. Properly
construed, the floating lien and purchase money provisions of the Code accomplish
this result, without the need of obtaining the prior lender's consent to subordination
which Ms. Aronov concedes is a problem. Id. at 63. See infra Part V. Indeed,
requiring the purchase money financier to obtain lien subordination agreements to
assure priority, frustrates the policy of the Code behind the purchase money priority,
which is to prevent the first lender from exercising a stranglehold on the debtor's
ability to obtain alternative sources of credit. See infra notes 139-43, 188-93 and
217 and accompanying text.
62. Aronov, supra note 21, at 48-55.
63. Id. at 55-59; Stilson, supra note 48, at 34-36; Lloyd, supra note 44, at
86-100.
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itself solely to providing purchase money obligations that result in
the acquisition of purchase money collateral, 64 the Code itself, given
its history and purposes, properly analyzed, will result in the proper
allocation of the inventory collateral to the respective secured parties
with the least cost and greatest benefit to all parties.
III. THE LANGUAGE OF THE CODE AND COMMENTS
A. The Text of Article 9
1. Express Overriding Policies Under Article 1
Before analyzing the pertinent text, comment, and history of
Article 9 as it relates to the PMSI in inventory, the overall policies
and purposes of the Code found in Article 1 must be considered.
The Code itself mandates that its provisions "be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. ' ' 65 The
Code expressly requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied
to promote simplicity, clarity, and modernity in the law of commer-
cial transactions, accommodation of expansion of commercial prac-
tices recognized in the applicable trade, and uniformity of the law
among the various jurisdictions. 66 Recognition of the validity of the
floating lien in the context of purchase money financing of inventory
clearly follows from these policies.
Validation of the floating lien generally, through the provisions
of sections 9-204 and 9-205, simplified and modernized commercial
lending. Supporters of the floating lien provisions realized that the
equivalent of the floating lien was available to lenders under the
myriad laws existing on the eve of the drafting of the Code, albeit
at excessive cost and difficulty. 67 The floating lien provisions of the
64. The transaction contemplated throughout this Article is one in which the
purchase money financier limits advances to the debtor solely to purchase money
obligations secured solely by purchase money collateral. See supra text following
note 35. Where a purchase money financier attempts to commingle purchase money
and nonpurchase money obligations and collateral, some allocation will be required.
See infra note 82.
65. UCC § 1-102(1) (1987).
66. UCC § 1-102(2) (1987).
67. UCC § 9-204, comment 2; see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
One opponent of the floating lien provisions of the Code testified before the N.Y.
Law Revision Commission that:
Mr. Ireton [a supporter of the Code's floating lien provisions] suggests
that he is already getting what is the equivalent of the floating lien. That
indicates that people who have intelligence and imagination can get it
without any new law. I think that it should be limited to those people so
that people with less intelligence and perhaps a lower degree of moral
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Code brought the byzantine laws of chattel security into line with
then-existing commercial practice. Recognition of the floating charge
in the context of purchase money inventory financing promotes the
policies of modernization and accommodation to commercial lending
practice.
The efficacy of purchase money financing of inventory is more
important today than even the drafters anticipated. Professor Gilmore
failed to fully anticipate the course of commercial financing under
the Code when he stated his view that "the pre-Code pattern under
which the long-term financing of the fixed assets of an enterprise
was divorced from the short-term financing of its inventory and
receivables" would continue under the Code.6 8 Whether for better or
for worse, Gilmore "guessed" wrongly. More recently, Professor
Lloyd summarized the reality of current financing practices:
Today the purchase money priority is more necessary than even the
UCC's drafters foresaw. Although the drafters foresaw the possi-
bility that some lenders would take a blanket security interest in all
of the borrower's personal property, they did not expect it would
be commonly done. Today, it is a standard practice in commercial
lending .69
As a result of this development in commercial practice, validation
of the floating lien in the context of the PMSI in inventory becomes
imperative if the purposes of the Code-to modernize the law of
commercial lending in accord with developed commercial practice,
and to protect the debtor from the potential stranglehold of the
general financier's after-acquired property clause- 70 are to be real-
ized.
Article 9 modernized commercial law largely through the order
and simplicity it brought to the area of chattel security. Such order
and simplicity ranks as perhaps the greatest accomplishment of Article
9. 71 The transformation rule threatens this order and simplicity by
standards would not be given an easy road.
2 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n 1954 Report, at 1205 (1954) (comments of George
B. McGowan).
68. Gilmore, supra note 21, at 1370. "What might be called the 'don't be a
pig' school of advice to Article 9 lenders has a fashionable currency and may be
expected to have some influence on lending patterns. The present author is inclined
to guess that the permissive floating lien, the whole-hog after-acquired property
clause, will not be unduly exploited . . . ." Id. at 1370-1371.
69. Lloyd, supra note 44, at 74;."[The after-acquired property clause] is an
especially common clause with respect to loans on collateral that 'turns over' such
as inventory and accounts." WrE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1095
(3rd ed. 1988); see WEST'S LEGAL FORMS, § 47.4, Forms 18-23 (2d ed. 1985); 19
AM. JUR. LEGAL FoRMs 2D §§ 253:3421-3440 (1974).
70. See supra notes 19-21 and infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text;
Hansford, supra note 26, at 258-259; and Scott, supra note 2, at 963.
71. See infra Part IV.B.I.
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forcing a retreat to complicated, expensive and detailed machinations
to acquire the effective equivalent of a pooling arrangement for
securing purchase money financing of inventory.7 2 Today, even under
a restrictive construction of a PMSI in inventory, the equivalent of
a limited floating charge can be obtained by using an allocation
formula that places the PMSI on a self-liquidating basis. 3 If self-
liquidation -is not feasible, the secured party may resort to the old
field warehousing technique as an alternative solution. 74 Through a
field warehouse, the lender can segregate physically the purchase
money collateral from all other inventory. The lender resolves the
issue of tracing by requiring payments on the loan each time certain,
identified collateral is removed from the warehouse.75 Of course,
these solutions require significant expense and potential delay to
implement, contrary to the purposes of simplifying and modernizing
the law of secured transactions. In addition, they provide no greater
protection to the prior secured party than the concept of "pooling"
advocated herein.
76
2. The Provisions of Article 9
With the general policies of the Code firmly in mind, the next
place to turn in analyzing the scope and meaning of any PMSI must
be to the language of the Code. Section 9-107 defines purchase
money security interest as follbws:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the
extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or
part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an
72. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
73. Southtrust Bank of Ala., Nat'l Ass'n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp.,
760 F.2d 1240, 1243 (lth Cir. 1985) (in dicta, the court approved of contractual
allocations of payments tied to collateral). However, such an allocation formula is
not always possible. Where the goods are fungible and not individually identifiable
(see infra Part VI), an allocation formula is not possible. In any event, the self-
liquidation scenario is problematic in many cases and is no longer the process
required by the Code. See infra notes 78-83, 181-85 and 197-203 and accompanying
text. See Lloyd, supra note 44, at 86-100.
74. See generally UCC § 9-305 (1987); Clark, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.12 (1980).
75. Id. Such tracing may require that the debtor only have the ability to
obtain from the warehouse a minimum amount of items, such as a full lot of shirts.
This may be unnecessary in light of debtor's business but nonetheless be required
by the secured party to permit paying off the debt associated with an identifiable
unit of goods, thereby preserving priority in the remaining inventory.
76. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text and Parts V.C. and VI.
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obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or
the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used.
77
This language creates a discrepancy between the treatment of the
seller as purchase money party and the third party lender as purchase
money party. Under section 9-107(a), the seller acquires a PMSI to
the extent that "the collateral" secures "all or part of its price."
'78
There appears to be an express requirement that the collateral in
which priority is claimed secure nothing other than the specific price
(obligation) relating to that particular item of collateral.79 On the
other hand, the language of subpart (b),80 only requires that the
obligation to be secured enables the debtor to acquire rights in or
the use of some collateral. There is no express tie between the
obligation incurred at any particular time and the collateral utilized
to secure that obligation, so long as both the obligations and the
collateral qualify as "purchase money." 8 Therefore, it may be argued
that a third party purchase money financier may claim purchase
money status under UCC section 9-107(b) with respect to any pur-
chase money collateral acquired by the debtor with purchase money
obligations, without regard to a specific correlation between any
particular item of purchase money collateral and any particular
purchase money obligation. That is, the third party purchase money
financier, under the express language of section 9-107(b), may "pool"
all purchase money obligations and secure them with all purchase
money collateral.12 Such an analysis of the text of UCC section 9-
77. UCC § 9-107 (1987).
78. UCC § 9-107(a) (1987) (emphasis supplied).
79. Even at this initial stage of statutory analysis, "one is immediately
confronted with the question of what the relevant unit of collateral is . . . ." UCC
Survey: Secured Transactions, 41 Bus. LAW. 1463, 1485 (1986). If Seller ships a
single shipment of 1000 widgets, what is "the collateral"? The entire shipment as
a unit, each box of widgets, each individual widget? See infra note 312 and
accompanying text.
80. A lender can acquire a PMSI to the extent that it "gives value" enabling
the acquisition "of collateral". Note the lack of any express linkage between the
specific value given and specific collateral acquired. U.C.C. § 9-107(b) (1987).
81. See supra text accompanying note 36, for definitions of "purchase money
obligations" and "purchase money collateral".
82. Id. In other words, so long as the purchase money financier can prove
that the outstanding indebtedness to be secured was in fact used by the debtor to
acquire new assets, then such debt would be characterized as "purchase money".
The secured party must demonstrate that the collateral claimed as security was in
fact acquired by the debtor with advances made by the lender. If shown, such assets
would be characterized as purchase money collateral. Thereafter, regardless of the
specific, direct relationship, at any particular time, between the outstanding purchase
money obligations and the existing purchase money collateral, the purchase money
financier would have priority in the purchase money collateral to secure the purchase
money obligations. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text regarding contrary
construction based on UCC § 9-107, comment 2. Of course, any advances which
1990]
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 57
107 creates a situation where the third party purchase money financier
is accorded better treatment than the seller purchase money financier.
Such an inconsistent result is not warranted and all purchase
money parties, whether they are sellers or third party financiers,
should be entitled to "pool" purchase money obligations and pur-
chase money collateral. 3 The language of sections 9-204, 9-205, and
9-312(3) all contribute to the conclusion that such blatant inconsis-
tency was not intended. Except with respect to consumer goods,
section 9-2044 imposes no limitation on the type of collateral capable
of being included in an after-acquired property clause. Section 9-204
does not include any restriction at all with respect to the ability to
secure future advances under a security agreement. Further, section
9-204 does not limit the effect of an after-acquired property or future
advance clause in the context of purchase money security interests. 5
are not used by the debtor to acquire new assets are not purchase money obligations
and are not given priority as to the purchase money collateral. Similarly, purchase
money obligations are not accorded priority in any of the debtor's assets other than
those assets constituting purchase money collateral. Where purchase money obliga-
tions and non-purchase money obligations have been advanced by the same lender,
Professor Lloyd has shown persuasively that the purchase money lender retains
priority in purchase money collateral to the extent of outstanding purchase money
obligations. See generally Lloyd, supra note 44, at 70-86.
83. Particularly when the collateral is inventory, a pooling concept seems
implicit in Article 9. As numerous courts and commentators have recog-
nized, inventory is by its nature a floating pool of assets, and its value as
collateral depends on that characteristic. Hence, a 'plain reading' of the
Section 9-107 reference to 'collateral' in the case of inventory suggests a
pool of assets as to which the constituent items change over time.
UCC Survey: Secured Transactions, 41 Bus. LAW. 1463, 1485 (1986). See also
Holzman v. L.H.J. Enters., 476 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1973), and Rosenberg v. Rudnick,
262 F.Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967) (each recognizing that liens in inventory, by the
nature of inventory, are in a floating mass of goods rather than in individual items).
84. § 9-204 provides:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a security agreement may
provide that any or all obligations covered by the security agreement are
to be secured by after-acquired collateral.
(2) No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause
to consumer goods other than accessions (Section 9-314) when given as
additional security unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days
after the secured party gives value.
(3) Obligations covered by a security agreement may include future
advances or other value whether or not the advances or value are given
pursuant to commitment (subsection (1) of Section 9-105).
UCC § 9-204 (1987).
85. In his article dealing with the effect of the Code on purchase money
financing, Professor Hogan noted that
[tlhe Code's formulation of an integrated body of chattel security law will
probably have its greatest impact in the financing of what is here called
inventory collateral which is not readily identifiable .... [Tihe Code rejects
the limitations placed on the kind of debtors, or the kind of lenders who
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Rather, other substantive Code provisions govern the effect to be
given to such clauses . 6
Not only does the text of section 9-204 place no restrictions on
the types of collateral or advances that validly may be included under
a security agreement, but in addition section 9-205 makes clear the
continued effectiveness of a security interest notwithstanding the
debtor's ability to use or commingle the collateral, or more signifi-
cantly, to fail to account to the secured party for proceeds or
dispositions of collateral.87 Although such actions by a debtor may
well deprive a purchase money financier of any collateral to secure
purchase money obligations, 8 section 9-205 expressly provides that
the security interest is "not invalid or fraudulent" against other
creditors, simply because the debtor has liberty to use and dispose
of the collateral without accounting. 9 The effect of invalidating the
floating lien, and requiring a strict, one-to-one correlation between
may take advantage of the flexibility of the newer security techniques.
Providing notice filing, authorizing central filing, validating after-acquired
property clauses, abolishing dominion rules, authorizing future advances-
all will help both the secured party and the debtor to use effectively this
class of inventory as collateral .... When the purchase money financer
dealing with such collateral finds that another financer has made a prior
filing, the purchase money holder should realize that the nature of the
collateral itself rather than any set of legal rules will create serious problems.
Hogan, Financing the Acquisition of New Goods Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 3 B.C. INDUs. & COM. L. REv. 115, 151-152 (1962). See Fedders Fin. Corp.
v. Chiarrelli Bros., 221 Pa. Super. 224, 289 A.2d 169 (1972) (notification given to
prior lender by purchase money financier includes after-acquired inventory reasonably
identified in notice); see also infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
86. UCC § 9-204, Comment 2 (1987), quoted infra at text accompanying
note 109.
87. § 9-205 provides:
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason
of liberty in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the
collateral (including returned or repossessed goods) or to collect or com-
promise accounts or chattel paper, or to accept the return of goods or
make repossessions, or to use, commingle or dispose of proceeds, or by
reason of the failure of the secured party to require the debtor to account
for proceeds or replace collateral. This section does not relax the require-
ments of possession where perfection of a security interest depends upon
possession of the collateral by the secured party or by a bailee.
UCC § 9-205 (1987). See also Hogan, supra note 85 at 151-152.
88. For example, debtor could sell all of the purchase money collateral in
the ordinary course of business without making any payments to the purchase money
financier. See UCC § 9-307 (1987). To avoid such a problem, the purchase money
financier, like all secured parties, must exercise diligence to protect its interest. See,
Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE
L.J. 1143, 1150-1152 (1979); Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:
A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10 (1981); Levmore, Monitors
and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 57-58 (1982).
89. UCC § 9-205 (1987).
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debt and collateral in order to maintain purchase money priority in
the inventory context, as a practical matter, eliminates section 9-205
in the context of purchase money inventory financing. 9° The Court
in Southtrust required just such a strict accounting and payments on
debt (tied to particular items of collateral) to maintain the validity
and priority of the PMSI. 9'
Section 9-312(3)92 sets forth the substantive rules relating to the
requirements for obtaining priority with respect to a PMSI in inven-
tory. In particular, sections 9-312 (c) and (d) indicate that on-going
purchase money financing was intended. The notice that the purchase
money financier must give to prior secured parties claiming an interest
in the same inventory constitutes the most significant requirement
for obtaining purchase money priority in inventory.93 Section 9-
90. Validation of the purchase money floating lien has no effect on the prior
secured creditor's floating lien. Such validation simply allows the purchase money
lien to retain the priority provided by § 9-312(3).
91. Southtrust Bank of Ala., Nat'l Ass'n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp.,
760 F.2d 1240, 1243 (1 th Cir. 1985). It has been asserted that, if the strict correlation
of debt to collateral required by Southtrust "is followed, purchase-money priority
in inventory will simply be unavailable." UCC Survey: Secured Transactions, 41
Bus. LAW. 1463, 1486 (1986).
92. § 9-312(3) provides:
(3) A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority
over a conflicting security interest in the same inventory and also has
priority in identifiable cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of
the inventory to a buyer if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor
receives possession of the inventory; and
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the
holder of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a financing
statement covering the same types of inventory (i) before the date of the
filing made by the purchase money secured party, or (ii) before the
beginning of the 21 day period where the purchase money security interest
is temporarily perfected without filing or possession (subsection (5) of
Section 9-304); and
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification
within five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory;
and
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects
to acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor,
describing such inventory by item or type.
UCC § 9-312(3) (1987).
93. In order to obtain purchase money priority in collateral other than
inventory, UCC § 9-312(4) merely requires that the purchase money security interest
be perfected within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral.
In order to acquire purchase money priority in inventory, all holders of prior security
interests in the same type of collateral who have filed financing statements, must
be notified of the competing interest and the purchase money security interest must
be perfected before the debtor receives possession of the collateral. Id. This procedure
assures that prior security interest holders will not be misled, to their detriment, by
the existence of the purchase money party. See infra notes 114-122 and accompanying
text and Part IV.B.
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312(3)(c) provides that the requisite notice is effective for five years,
by analogy to the period of effectiveness of a financing statement. 94
It is reasonable to presume that, given the nature of inventory
financing as an on-going relationship, 95 this clarification was made
to simplify the development of on-going purchase money financing
relationships in inventory. 96 If the drafters contemplated one-shot
transactions, they would have required the purchase money financier
to give notice each time a PMSI in inventory was anticipated.
In addition, section 9-312(3)(d) requires that the collateral that is
to be subject to the PMSI need only be described by "item or
type." ' 97 While the purchase money financier is wise to be as specific
in this description as possible in order to facilitate the later identi-
fication of its collateral, 98 the broad nature. of the permissible de-
scription facilitates an on-going relationship when the particular items
to be supplied may not be known in advance. If the drafters intended
to limit purchase money financing to one-shot transactions, a more
specific description would not be an undue burden and would have
been required. 99
B. The Comments
The statements of purpose contained in the comments to the
previously discussed sections support the foregoing construction of
the Code provisions relating to purchase money financing of inven-
tory.1°° Comment 1 to section 9-107 refers to the "existing" prefer-
94. This construction is clarified in the 1972 Reason for Change 2(a) accom-
panying the 1972 Amendments to Article 9, and is implicit in the text of § 9-
312(3)(c). The notice must be received by the prior secured party "within five years
before the debtor receives possession of the inventory." Accordingly, a notice sent
in 1982 will still be effective with respect to a delivery of inventory in 1986. See
infra note 96.
95. Kripke, Current Assets Financing as a Source of Long-Term Capital, 36
MiNN. L. REv. 506 (1952); Weeks, "Floating Liens" in Inventory Financing, 1956
U. ILL. L. F. 557 (1956); Gilmore, supra note 21 at 1380-1382; see supra notes 83
and 85, and infra notes 174-181 and accompanying text; and infra Part V.C. See
also Holzman v. L.H.J. Enters., 476 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1967) and Rosenberg v.
Rudnick, 262 F.Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967) (explanation, supra note 83).
96. ". . . [Tlhe purchase money financier may satisfy the requirement [of
notice] for a series of transactions by a single notice." Hogan, supra note 85, at
144. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
97. UCC § 9-312(3)(d) (1987); Hogan, supra note 85, at 141.
98. See supra notes 82 and 85.
99. Even in the context of "fungible" items of inventory, such as hardware
or shirts, a more specific description, for example including the quantity of goods
delivered, is possible in a single transaction. However, where on-going financing is
anticipated, the only description possible is a general description by item or type.
100. The importance and propriety of the comments in the interpretation of
the provisions of the Code have been the subject of considerable debate. See Skilton,
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ence for "purchase money obligations."'0'° From the outset, the
drafters intended to protect the new value lender against the party
who simply improves its position vis a vis other creditors. 02 "Thus
a purchase money obligation has priority over an interest acquired
under an after-acquired property clause."'0 3
Comment 2 to section 9-107'4 has been construed as limiting a
PMSI solely to the price or obligation incurred for specific collateral.
This construction is based on the premise that the purchase money
financer, by asserting priority as to subsequent deliveries of collateral
as security for earlier purchase money advances, obtains a "security
interest [in the subsequent collateral] taken as security for or in
satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or antecedent debt [the purchase
money obligation relating to the first shipment].''105 While this inter-
Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 Wis.
L. REV. 597 (1966); Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798 (1958). Suffice to say that careful analytical use of
the comments, to a greater extent than the drafting and legislative history of the
Code, see note 144 infra, is indispensable in determining the proper purpose and
policy underlying the Code's provisions. As Professor Gedid has noted,
"The Code commentary was a major part of the patent reason device
[employed by Llewellyn in drafting the Code]. Llewellyn argued that the
use of written statutory commentary was a necessary condition for the
sound development of commercial law by the courts, and that the purpose
of a commentary was to guide and connect the development of legal
material as a whole .... [T]he comments would also show the purpose,
policy, or reason for a Code section, group of sections, article, or articles.
The commentary was thus an indispensable part of Llewellyn's patent
reason technique....
Gedid, UCC Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 341, 375 (1988).
101. UCC § 9-107, comment 1 (1987) (emphasis supplied). This preference for
securing the obligation advanced to the debtor for acquisition of new assets is firmly
rooted in the pre-code common law relating to purchase money financing. See
Lloyd, supra note 44, at 16, where the author concludes that modern authority has
recognized that, at common law, "it is the nature of the debt rather than the
technicalities surrounding the execution and delivery of the security device that is
responsible for the purchase money priority."
102. See infra Part IV.B.I.c.
103. UCC § 9-107, comment 1 (1987).
104. When a purchase money interest is claimed by a secured party who
is not a seller, he must of course have given present consideration. This
section therefore provides that the purchase money party must be one who
gives value 'by making advances or incurring an obligation': the quoted
language excludes from the purchase money category any security interest
taken as security for or in satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or antecedent
debt.
UCC § 9-107, comment 2 (1987).
105. Id. This construction of the comment was first put forward in In re
Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243, 246 (Bankr. W.D. Mich 1966) and
was followed uncritically by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Manuel,
507 F.2d 990, 992 (5th Cir. 1975).
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pretation may be appealing initially, given the Code's preference for
new value and the recognition of inventory financing as an on-going
relationship, this construction takes an unduly narrow view of the
protections afforded the purchase money financier by the Code. A
view more in line with the policies of the Code results in approaching
the purchase money inventory arrangement as a "pooling concept."'°6
At the time of the subsequent shipment, the purchase money financier
makes a contemporaneous advance. That is, the purchase -money
financier supplies new value each time new assets are provided to
the debtor and makes repeated infusions of assets to the borrower's
estate. Accordingly, the collateral securing the indebtedness does
secure the price of all the collateral made available by the purchase
money financier. In the context of a pure purchase money on-going
relationship, every dollar advanced to the debtor, in fact, constitutes
value given "to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral,' 10 7 which is all the collateral that is claimed (or can be
claimed) by the purchase money financier. Therefore, the purchase
money financier has satisfied the requirements of the section and the
comment. More to the point, this comment, in the overall context
and scheme of the Code's purchase money provisions, does no more
than restate the distinction drawn by the drafters between old value
and new value in the earlier drafts. 0 8
106. See supra note 83. For further criticism of this construction of comment
2, see Aronov, supra note 21, at 43-44 and Lloyd, supra note 44, at 49-50.
107. UCC § 9-107 (1987).
108. Professor Gilmore's discussion of the concept of "new value"/"present
consideration" in the context of § 9-107(b) is instructive.
The 'person' described in [§ 9-107(b)] is evidently one who gives what the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act called 'new value.'. . . In 9-108, which deals
with the problem of when interests in after-acquired property are to be
considered as having been taken for new value or for old debt, there is a
reference to a secured party who "makes an advance, incurs an obligation,
releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value ......
[§ 9-108 quoted in part.]
There is no apparent reason why the concept of 'new value' with respect
to a purchase money security interest under 9-107 should be any less broad
than the concept as it appears in 9-108. Evidently no past consideration or
antecedent debt will support the 9-107 purchase money interest. Something
must be given, more or less simultaneously with the debtor's acquisition
of property, which is intended to, and which does, enable him to acquire
the property .... Taken literally, 9-107 seems to say that only 'making
advances' or 'incurring an obligation' (which would presumably include a
commitment to the debtor to make an advance as well as a binding promise,
by way of guaranty or otherwise, to pay the seller) qualify as 'value' for
the purpose of 9-107. It is suggested, in line with the 9-108 comment, that
the references to advances and obligations be taken in 9-107, as they clearly
must be taken in 9-108, as merely illustrations of the underlying concept
of 'new value.' (Citation to § 9-107, comment.)
Gilmore, supra note 21, at 1374-1375.
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The comments to section 9-204 demonstrate the drafters' intention
to validate, in the broadest fashion, the floating lien. Noting the
nineteenth century prejudice against the floating charge the comment
states that early courts were of the opinion
that a commercial borrower should not be allowed to encumber all
his assets present and future, and that for the protection not only
of the borrower but of his other creditors a cushion of free assets
should be preserved. That inarticulate premise has much to rec-
ommend it. This Article decisively rejects it not on the ground that
it was wrong in policy but on the ground that it was not effec-
tive .... This Article, in expressly validating the floating charge,
merely recognizes an existing state of things.
The substantive rules of law set forth in the balance of the
Article are designed to achieve the protection of the debtor and the
equitable resolution of the conflicting claims of creditors, which the
old rules no longer give. 1°9
This comment makes clear the universal scope of an after-acquired
property clause, except as specifically limited by section 9-204(2)
relating to consumer goods. Section 9-204 validates the floating
charge in all contexts and with respect to all forms of collateral.110
It is left to the "substantive rules of law" set forth elsewhere in
Article 9 to establish the necessary debtor protections and resolve
the resulting conflicts between creditors."1
The strict tracing of purchase money obligations to the specific
purchase money collateral giving rise to that specific obligation does
not take account of the relaxation of the control required to be
exercised by the secured party under section 9-205. The section repeals
specifically the rule of Benedict v. Ratnor.112 The comment states
The principal effect of the Benedict rule has been, not to discourage
or eliminate security transactions in inventory and accounts receiv-
able-on the contrary such transactions have vastly increased in
volume-but rather to force financing arrangements in this field to
a self-liquidating basis. Furthermore, several lower court cases ...
required lenders operating in this field to observe a number of
needless and costly formalities: for example it was thought necessary
for the debtor to make daily remittances to the lender of all
collections received, even though the amount remitted is immediately
109. UCC § 9-204, comment 2 (1987) (emphasis supplied).
110. See Hogan, supra note 85.
111. As noted, see supra notes-79-83 and accompanying text, nothing in the
text of § 9-107 limits the efficacy of the after-acquired property clause in the
purchase money context. Indeed, the "substantive rules of law" which govern
conflicting claims of creditors in the purchase money context are found in § 9-
312(3)-(4) and § 9-313.
112. Benedict v. Ratnor, 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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returned to the debtor in order to keep the loan at an agreed level." 3
Comment 3 notes that the policing requirements of Benedict, which
section 9-205 repeals "in matters of form," must be reconsidered in
light of the notice provisions required by the filing rules in section
9-302.114 That is, providing notice of the security interest avoids the
problems of fraud and misleading that concerned Justice Brandeis in
Benedict."5 This is critical in the context of the PMSI in inventory.
Not only must the purchase money financier of inventory perfect its
interest before the debtor's receipt of the-goods, but it must also
give notice of the claimed PMSI to any creditor who has filed a
financing statement." 6 Accordingly, the notice provisions of section
9-312(3) eliminate the opportunity for deception of other creditors
by assuring that all interested parties possess knowledge of the
situation and can take appropriate measures to protect their interests.
Comment 3 to section 9-312 applies this idea of notice directly
to the purchase money. situation involving inventory.
The reason for the additional requirement of notification is that
typically the arrangement between an inventory secured party and
his debtor will require the secured party to make periodic advances
against incoming inventory or periodic releases of old inventory as
new inventory is received. A fraudulent debtor may apply to the
secured party for advances even though he has already given a
security interest in the inventory to another secured party. The
notification requirement protects the inventory financer ,in such a
situation: if he has received notification, he will presumably not
make an advance; if he has not received notification (or if the other
interest does not qualify as a purchase money interest), any advance
he may make will have priority.'
7
Once the prior inventory financier receives notice that a purchase
money financier exists, it can protect its interest by not making
further advances against the purchase money inventory. It is true
that the prior financier may lose all inventory collateral by virtue of
the sale of the existing (nonpurchase money) inventory collateral." '
It is also true, however, that "presumably," the prior financier has
not advanced any new funds against the purchase money inventory"19
and, if necessary, can decrease the amount of the outstanding ad-
113. UCC § 9-205, comment 1 (1987).
114. Id., comment 3.
115. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 364-65.
116. UCC § 9-312(3) (1987).
117. UCC § 9-312, comment 3 (1987).
118. This consideration appears to have been of significant concern to Pro-
fessor Hansford resulting in his view that the limited role left for purchase money
inventory financing by the Southtrust case is preferable to the on-going scenario
advocated by this Article. See Hansford, supra note 28, at 262.
119. UCC § 9-312, comment 3 (1987).
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vances,120 and the prior financer, in most cases, will have a prior
security interest in accounts receivable12 1 created by the sale of the
purchase money inventory in the ordinary course of debtor's busi-
ness. 
22
The text and comments to sections 9-107, 9-204, 9-205 and 9-312
all evince a purpose to give the purchase money inventory financier
the ability to enter into an on-going relationship with the debtor.
Such a relationship can only be effective if the purchase money
financier enjoys the benefits of the floating lien. As the third com-
ment to section 9-312 notes: "Prior law, under one or another theory,
usually contrived to protect purchase money interests over after-
acquired property interests .... While this Article broadly validates
the after-acquired property interest, it also recognizes as sound the
preference which prior law gave to the purchase money interest."' 23
Viewed as a whole, the text and comments of the pertinent provisions
of Article 9 demonstrate a clear preference for purchase money
interests and obligations. The Article also recognizes the reality of
inventory financing and the need for flexibility on the part of the
secured party to permit the debtor to operate his business without
undue technical interference, made necessary solely to protect the
priority of the secured party. Taken together these policies require
validation of the floating lien in the context of the PMSI in inventory.
Such a broad construction is not, however, limitless. Properly con-
strued, the PMSI will have no detrimental effects on the prior lender,
but will allow the debtor to obtain additional credit from an outside
source.
24
Analysis of the drafting and legislative history of the relevant
provisions of Article 9 will demonstrate the validity of the foregoing
construction. The pre-Code development of the after-acquired prop-
erty clause and purchase money preference greatly influenced the
earliest drafts of Article 9. The after-acquired property provisions
and the purchase money provisions of Article 9 complimented and
reinforced the policies and purposes of the Code to facilitate com-
mercial transactions while protecting the legitimate interests of all
parties. This symbiotic relationship between the floating lien and the
PMSI manifested itself from the earliest drafts of the Code and
120. By applying payments received from the debtor and not readvancing
except against collateral as to which the prior lender maintains priority, i.e., non-
purchase money collateral.
121. See supra note 69 and accompanying text, regarding standard general
secured financing practices utilizing blanket liens.
122. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1987). See infra Part VI regarding the scope of
the PMSI in inventory and the lack of prejudice to the prior secured party.
123. UCC § 9-312, comment 3 (1987).
124. See infra Part VI (regarding the proper limitations on the scope of the
PMSI inventory and the rights and duties of the parties).
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confirms the broad validation of the purchase money priority advo-
cated herein.
IV. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS: PRE-CODE INVENTORY FINANCING
AND THE DRAFTING AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ARTICLE 9
A. Pre-Code Inventory Financing
1. The After-Acquired Property Clause
The PMSI, whether in inventory or other collateral, may be
viewed as a sort of "quid pro quo" following the validation of the
after-acquired property clause. 125 Consequently, in order to fully
appreciate the proper scope to be accorded the PMSI in inventory
under the Code, it is necessary to review, briefly, how pre-Code law
dealt with the after-acquired property clause in the context of inven-
tory financing. 
126
The common-law courts had a conceptual difficulty with the idea
that one could mortgage property that one did not yet own. 127 As a
result of such "metaphysical" difficulties, 128 early common-law courts
generally were unwilling to recognize the efficacy of after-acquired
property clauses. With the advent of expanding commerce in the
latter nineteenth century, however, courts began to validate the after-
acquired property clause as it related to fixed assets. 129
Notwithstanding the trend toward validation of after-acquired
property clauses vis-a-vis fixed, relatively permanent assets, such as
equipment, difficulties remained concerning application to the "mort-
gage on a shifting stock," that is, inventory liens. The courts were
concerned by the appearance of a large bulk of unencumbered assets,
coupled with the perceived inability to give adequate notice of the
lien to other creditors, which could mislead unsecured creditors as
125. See supra note 24 and infra note 140; Gilmore, supra note 21, at 1334.
126. For more detailed analysis of the historical development of the after-
acquired property clause in the context of inventory financing, see generally, Gilmore,
supra note 21; 1 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, §§ 2.3-2.5,
4.4, 4.8, 4.12, 5.4, and chapter 6 (1965) [hereinafter 1 GILMORE, PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY], Gilmore & Axlerod, Chattel Security: I, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 533-41 (1948)
[hereinafter Gilmore, Chattel 1]; Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57 YALE L.J. 761
(1948) [hereinafter Gilmore, Chattel III; Cohen & Gerber, The After-acquired
Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1939); Skilton, Mortgages on Merchandise,
1963 Wis. L. REV. 359 (1963); Weeks, "Floating Liens" in Inventory Financing,
1956 U. ILL. L. F. 557 (1956).
127. Cohen & Gerber, supra note 126, at 635; 1 GILMORE, PERSONAL PROPERTY,
supra note 126, at 33; Skilton, supra note 126, at 399.
128. Gilmore, Chattel Security I1, supra note 126, at 776.
129. Cohen & Gerber, supra note 126, at 654; 1 GILMORE, PERSONAL PROPERTY,
supra note 126, at 39.
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to the availability of unencumbered assets for realization. 130 If the
inventory, by its nature, was constantly manufactured, sold, and
replaced by new inventory, the question became how could other
creditors keep track of the lien and the collateral subject thereto. 3
The issue of control also worried the courts. The use of a liquid
asset, such as inventory, as collateral lent itself to fraudulent mach-
inations by debtor and secured creditor. The debtor and creditor
could arrange their affairs in such a way that the debtor made
minimal payments on the secured debt and retained the proceeds of
the inventory for its own use.3 2 Finally, the courts believed that the
debtor should be required to maintain a "pool" of free, unencum-
bered assets for the satisfaction of claims of unsecured creditors.'
As a result of this bias against the after-acquired property clause as
it related to inventory (and accounts receivable), such assets remained
largely unavailable as a source of credit for debtors.
34
The needs of expanding commerce and the realization that for
many debtors, inventory comprised the largest asset and source of
credit,'35 all led to piecemeal legislation to validate the lien on
130. Professor Skilton traces the bias against the after-acquired property clause
in inventory to the traditional concern over the fraudulent propensities of such a
device. See generally, Skilton, supra note 126, at 359-89.
131. On this issue, Gilmore stated:
An alternative way of rationalizing the invalidity of the stock in trade
mortgage came to be the idea that there was something wrong-or "incon-
sistent" with the nature of a mortgage-in a shifting mass of collateral.
The lien had to be "certain"; if the mortgage security was in a constant
state of flux as the mortgagor sold the existing stock and replaced it with
new stock, then the required certainty of lien was gone.
1 GILMOR.E, PERSONAL PROPERTY, supra note 126, at 41.
132. See supra note 130. This was the principal concern of Justice Brandeis
in Benedict v. Ratnor, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), though that case involved accounts
receivable.
133. UCC § 9-204 comment 2 (1987).
134. Professor Gilmore set forth the traditional concerns regarding the floating
lien in the following words:
The case against the floating lien, ... consists principally of two points:
1) the availability of a floating or blanket lien on all present and future
assets will leave nothing to satisfy the claims of unsecured creditors and
will consequently tend to dry up the sources of such credit; 2) the law
should protect a necessitous borrower against himself by refusing to allow
him to encumber all the property he may ever own in order to secure a
present loan.
Gilmore, supra note 21, at 1335. Cohen and Gerber added to these concerns a third:
"Interrelated [with the substance of the concerns noted by Gilmore] is the constant
problem of notice to creditors and purchasers that the property is subject to a lien
in order that there be no reliance upon a false appearance of prosperity." Cohen
& Gerber, supra note 126, at 647.
135. Weeks, supra note 126, at 557-59; Kripke, Current Assets Financing as
a Source of Long Term Capital, 36 MINN. L. REV. 506, 510-11 (1952); Skilton,
Field Warehousing as a Financing Device: The Warehouseman Goes to the Storer -
Part 1, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 221, 223-24 (1961).
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inventory. The conditional sale, the chattel mortgage, the trust re-
ceipt, field warehousing, and factor's liens acts provided some basis
for the present realization (through secured credit) of future assets
comprised of inventory. 3 6 Because of these developments, a state of
affairs existed on the eve of the drafting of the Code which led
Gilmore to assert that, although very complicated and difficult,. one
could effectively obtain credit on the security of present and after-
acquired inventory. That is, the floating lien on inventory did exist.,3 7
2. The Purchase Money Security Interest
Although the after-acquired property clause gained grudging ac-
ceptance by the courts and legislatures,' one problem remained. As
one author put it, the validation of the after-acquired property clause
resulted in "a somewhat refined sort of peonage."' 13 9 Once validated,
the after-acquired property clause permitted a debtor to mortgage all
present and future assets to a single creditor. Accordingly, no assets
remained to secure or satisfy other creditors, and the threat persisted
that the secured creditor with a blanket lien maintained a stranglehold
on the debtor's ability to obtain financing or credit from other
sources.
The courts responded to this threat to the independence and
viability of the debtor by developing the parallel concept of the
purchase money priority. 4° Notwithstanding the existence of a valid
136. Gilmore, Chattel Security I, supra note 126, passim; Gilmore, Chattel
Security II, supra note 126; Stilson, supra note 48, at 11-14; Aronov, supra .note
21, at 15-17.
137. Professor Gilmore, in 1954, testified before the New York Law Revision
Commission studying the adoption of the UCC in New York. In support of the
floating lien he stated:
I suggest that the law of New York as it is, and this is also true of the
law of all other jurisdictions, is what you might call a 95 per cent floating
charge deal and that the only change the Code really makes is to go from
95 per cent to 100 per cent and get rid of the vestiges of confusion and
arbitrary formalism, which are today all that is left of the original nineteenth
century prohibition or rule as of about 1850, that there should be no
floating charge at all.
2 N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N 1954 REPORT at 1180 (1954). See also, Gilmore,
supra note 21, at 1335.
138. Gilmore, supra note 21, at 1333-34.
139. Cohen & Gerber, supra note 126, at 647.
140. Gilmore, supra note 21, at 1334.
As a matter of history, however, the triumph of the after-acquired property
interest has been regularly followed by an important limitation or qualifi-
cation. The after-acquired interest, wherever it has been recognized as valid
against the borrower's creditors and in his bankruptcy, has been subordi-
nated to subsequent purchase money interests which arise in connection
with the financing of new acquisitions by the borrower.
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after-acquired property clause, a creditor who actually provided the
funds that enabled the debtor to acquire new assets received priority
in those assets, to secure the obligation arising from the acquisition
of such collateral, ahead of a prior after-acquired property lien.'
41
By allowing the debtor to grant such a priority, the courts enabled
the debtor, to a certain extent, to obtain financing from other sources.
No prejudice to the prior secured creditor would result because the
property securing the purchase money financier is in addition to the
collateral already available to (and presumably relied upon by) the
prior secured creditor.
42
On the eve of the drafting of the Code, therefore, the situation
was such that, with a great deal of time and effort, a creditor could
obtain a "blanket lien" on all of a debtor's particular assets, whether
then owned or thereafter acquired.' 3 To offset this power, the courts
established purchase money priority that empowered the debtor to
grant a prior lien to a creditor, whether seller or financier, who
provided funds to augment the debtor's estate through the acquisition
of specific new assets.
B. Inventory Financing Under the Code-The Drafting and
Legislative History of the After-Acquired Property Clause and
Purchase Money Priority
1. The Early Drafts
Notwithstanding the debate among scholars concerning the ap-
propriate use of the drafting and legislative history of the Code in
interpreting the provisions of the present Code, in light of the stated
purposes and policies of the Code it is important to understand what
the drafters of the Code attempted to accomplish. 1 Consequently,
141. Id.
142. Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of
Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 938-41 (1985);
Scott, supra note 2, at 961-64; see infra, Part V.C.
143. See supra note 137.
144. While some urge a very restrictive reliance on the drafting history (i.e.,
prior drafts and comments) and, to a lesser extent, on legislative history (e.g., the
Report of the N.Y. State Law Revision Commission), in interpreting the Code, see
WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 11 (3rd ed. 1988), others take the
strong position that reference to prior drafts and comments and legislative history
are a fundamental part of any proper interpretation of the Code. McDonnell,
Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications for
Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795 (1978).
Section 1-102(3)(g) of the Official Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code,
1952 Text and Comments edition, provided that "[P]rior drafts of text and comments
may not be used to ascertain legislative intent." Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 16, p. 44. The
comment to that provision stated, "It is also intended by subsection 3(g) to preclude
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prior drafts and comments are instructive in seeking a better under-
standing of the purposes and policies behind today's Code. 45 Cer-
tainly the drafters intended to simplify the many security devices that
antedated the Code.4 6The unification and simplification of pre-Code
security devices were the most revolutionary features of the new
Code. In the area of after-acquired property and purchase money
priority, however, the Code merely took to its logical conclusion the
development of the law through the middle of the twentieth century. 147
The evolution of the drafting of the Code establishes three
relevant themes for an analysis of the floating lien in relation to the
purchase money priority: (1) that the subject of chattel security
required a unified approach, subject to the drafters' realization that
different types of collateral required different rules in light of the
function of such collateral in a particular context; 14 (2) that the
reality of commercial finance as it had developed up to the time of
the drafting of the Code required the validation of the so-called
"floating lien" or "blanket security interest" (the after-acquired
property clause); 49 and finally, (3) that a clear preference must be
given to "new value" additions to the debtor's estate, manifested by
the purchase money priority provisions.5 0
resort to prior drafts either of text or comment to ascertain intent. Frequently
matters have been omitted as being implicit without statement and language has
been changed or added solely for clarity." Id. at 47. This provision and comment
were deleted by the 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code. Kelly, Drafts Vol 18, p. 27.
In light of the drafting history of Section 1-102(3)(g), one embarking upon
interpretation of the provisions of the Code through the use of drafting and legislative
history should proceed carefully. However, the cautious use of prior drafts and
legislative history is justified given the realist philosophy of the drafters of the Code,
particularly Karl Llewellyn. It bears repeating that Llewellyn's influence on the Code
was profound. Gedid, UCC Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29
WM. & MARY L. REv. 341, 354 (1988), Twn ING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT Ch. 12 (1973). Llewellyn's "principle of the patent reason" requires that
"the interpreter [of a statute] must be given every encouragement to interpret the
instrument in accordance with its objectives." TWINING, at 321. By the cautious
review of prior drafts and comments it is possible to obtain greater insights into
the "objectives," the "patent reasons," for the existing provisions of the Code.
With such objectives in mind, one can then interpret the present language of the
Code in accordance with those objectives.
145. UCC § 9-101 comment (1987).
146. Id. "Pre-Code law recognized a wide variety of security devices. ...
Under this article the traditional distinctions among security devices ... are not
retained; the Article applies to all transactions intended to create security interests
in personal property ... ." Id.
147. See supra note 137; Lloyd, supra note 44, at 10-37.
148. See infra Part IV.B.I.a.
149. See infra Part IV.B.I.b.
150. See infra Part IV.B.I.c.
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a. Classification of Types of Collateral
From the very outset the drafters recognized that, not only were
the various forms of security (chattel mortgage, conditional sale,
trust receipt, etc.) an unnecessary complication, but that commercial
transactions were hampered "by a conceptual approach to problems
which need diverse treatment." '51 Accordingly, the drafters deter-
mined to proceed along functional lines, keeping in mind the need
to balance the fundamental, often conflicting, objectives of chattel
security, identified as (1) protection of the debtor; (2) protection of
creditors; and (3) protection of purchasers. 5 2 The drafters recognized
that "[t]hese objectives are not of equal importance in all situations
where financing occurs, yet legislation designed to protect the debtor,
where the debtor is a consumer for example, often has been drafted
so as to apply even to a large loan obtained by a large commercial
enterprise."' 53 This premise, that the protections of various parties
required different emphasis depending on the transactional context,
resulted in an initial approach to the article on secured transactions
that delineated separate parts setting forth the rules for differing
situations, for example, separate parts for consumer transactions,
farming transactions, and inventory financing. 54 The drafters per-
ceived that such an organizational framework would permit legislation
that could properly balance the often conflicting primary protec-
tions. "' Specifically, in the area of inventory financing, the insecurity
of the "mortgage on a shifting stock" was considered a primary
problem. The drafters believed that "[tihe preferable approach ...
is to validate a security interest in inventory and then define the
rights of third parties.' ' 5
6
The drafters abandoned the approach of creating a Code with
separate parts for differing commercial transactions in the September
Revisions to the 1949 Draft of the Article on Secured Transactions. 5 7
The drafters, however, did not abandon the concept of special
treatment of various types of collateral based upon the collateral's
function in a particular context, for example, consumer goods fi-
nancing as opposed to inventory financing. 15 8 The comment to section
8-101 of the September 1949 Revisions states that "[t]he theory of
151. Kelly, Drafts Vol. 4, at 285 (Comment to Tentative Draft No. 1 - Article
VII (1948)).
152. Id. at 286.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 287.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 288.
157. Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 8.
158. See supra text accompanying note 153.
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the Article stems from the function of security."' 5 9 Comment 4 to
section 8-102 of the same draft states, "While most Sections of this
Article apply to a security interest without regard to the nature of
the collateral or its use, some sections state special rules with reference
to particular types of collateral." ' 60
The evolution from separate treatment for differing transactions
to a more unified approach with special rules for different types of
collateral is significant in two respects. First, this change in style
reflects the view that chattel security should be approached on a
more unified basis. The numerous technicalities surrounding chattel
security should be eliminated to the greatest extent possible, consistent
with the purpose of making the rules relating to chattel security
responsive to the varying needs of commerce in different settings.'
61
Second, this evolution reflects the drafters' judgment that, in certain
circumstances, the type of collateral should affect the rules.162 This
further supports the conclusion that the drafters intended to create
a system of chattel security that reflected the functions and purposes
of the collateral serving as security in accordance with commercial
need and reality. 63 The resulting statute unifies the body of chattel
security law to the greatest extent possible, and yet, maintains the
functional differences among the types of collateral in the commercial
world. 164
159. UCC § 8-101 comment (September 1949 Revisions), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 8,
at 283 (emphasis supplied).
160. UCC § 8-102 comment 4 (September 1949 Revisions), Kelly, Drafts Vol.
8, at 285. Although the index of sections following this comment has changed
through the drafts of the Code, it is significant that the prefatory language of this
comment (setting forth the underlying philosophy of the Code in this context) is
identical to the language of the present UCC § 9-102 comment 5 (1987).
161. UCC § 8-101 comment (September 1949 Revisions) Kelly, Drafts Vol. 8,
at 282-83; UCC § 9-101 comment (1987).
162. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text; Hansford, supra note 28,
at 307-08.
163. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
164. As noted earlier in notes 44-51 and accompanying text, the transformation
rule developed and has been applied almost entirely in the context of consumer
bankruptcy litigation. In the course of analyzing the applicability of the transfor-
mation rule in the commercial setting of the PMSI in inventory, the court in
Southtrust Bank of Ala., Nat'l Ass'n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d
1240 (lth Cir. 1985), stated, "Nothing in the language of UCC § 9-312(3) or § 9-
107 distinguishes between consumer and commercial transactions or between bank-
ruptcy and non-bankruptcy contexts. We see no policy reasons for creating a
distinction where the drafters have not done so." Southtrust, 760 F.2d at 1242.
While the "language" of § 9-107 admittedly makes no such distinction, see Lloyd,
supra note 44, at 52 n.247, the underlying purposes and policies of the Code do
make this distinction and support a broad construction of the PMSI in inventory.
See supra Part II and Part III.B. With respect to the reference to § 9-312(3), the
Court is simply wrong. Section 9-312(3) relates solely to inventory collateral, a
commercial form of collateral. See supra notes 49 and 52. The purchase money
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b. The "Floating Lien" and Inventory Finance
As already noted, 165 the "mortgage on a shifting stock" was
insecure and difficult to accomplish prior to the Code in light of
judicial bias against the floating lien. The Introductory Comments
to Tentative Draft No. 2 stated the concern as follows:
How could something be security which was likely to be consumed
or gone before the debt was paid off? Wasn't this really an attempt
to appear secured and to defeat the unsecured creditors when in
reality there was no security since the mortgagee had no control
over the security? At any rate, the common law said that a chattel
mortgage on a stock of merchandise was either void against creditors
or it was presumptively fraudulent.'16
The comment sets forth three forms of inventory security that were
potentially available under pre-Code law to avoid this judicial con-
cern. 67 First, the parties could attempt to utilize the floating lien.
However, this was subject to invalidation in bankruptcy under the
preference rules and further, because of the control requirement
imposed by cases following Benedict v. Ratnor. 68 A second method
was the trust receipt type of financing where, upon sale of the
inventory by the debtor, a set portion of the indebtedness relating
to the item sold, would be satisfied. The problems here related to
the deprivation of the debtor's sole source of capital for running the
business and to the impracticability of such an arrangement when
the inventory was comprised of small, fungible goods such as "shirts,
priority provision relating to consumer goods is set forth in § 9-312(4). The
procedural requirements for priority set forth in § 9-312(3) are specifically tailored
to the unique circumstances of inventory finance and constitute one of the special
rules contemplated by the drafters in the classification of the types of collateral.
See UCC § 9-102 comment 5 (1987). While a unitary concept of chattel security is
a hallmark of Article 9, the drafters were aware, from the beginning, of the need
for special rules where the context of the commercial transaction made such
distinction necessary. The drafters recognized the differences between consumer
finance and commercial financing of inventory. See supra note 49.
Other courts have acknowledged the policies underlying the varying treatment
of distinct forms of collateral in different contexts. See, e.g., In re Mid-Atlantic
Flange Co., 26 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 203, 208 (E.D. Pa. 1979); In re Gibson,
16 Bankr. 257, 264 (D. Kan. 1981); John Deere Co. v. Production Credit Ass'n,
39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 684 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
165. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
166. Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 5, at 156 (Comment to Tentative Draft No. 2 - Article
VII (1948)).
167. Id. at 156-58.
168. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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small hardware, etc. 16 9 To avoid this practical problem and prevent
the debtor's loss of needed working capital, a third method, a
"revolving loan" arrangement, could be utilized. In this case, the
debtor would remit all proceeds of inventory sales to the secured
creditor on a daily basis and the creditor would relend amounts
needed by the debtor. This, of course, entailed significant and costly
monitoring and paper work by both the debtor and the creditor. 170
The drafters recognized the inherent problems in the foregoing
machinations utilized to avoid restrictions on the floating lien in
inventory. Accordingly, the drafters decided to recognize the reality
of inventory financing by validating the floating lien through the
after-acquired property and future advance provisions, and the spe-
cific overruling of the control requirements of Benedict v. Ratnor.
In the area of inventory financing, the evolution to this position is
instructive. In Tentative Draft No. 2, September 1948, the drafters
developed the concepts of the "Specific Inventory Lien" and the
"General Inventory Lien.' ' 7' The Draft limited the availability of
the specific inventory lien to situations where the collateral was of a
type that would permit self-liquidation of the indebtedness upon sale
of the inventory. Section 302(4) of Tentative Draft No. 2 provided:
An inventory lien is "specific" when it is on the borrower's interest
in identified or segregated units of inventory and when a specified
portion of the obligation secured by the lien is to be paid or
discharged when each unit of such inventory is sold, consumer [sic],
or so disposed of as to lose its separate identity. 7 2
Any other lien on inventory was a "General Inventory Lien.' ' 73
Under section 308(2) the specific lien could not include after-acquired
169. Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 5, at 157. Professor Gilmore testified before the N.Y.
State Law Revision Commission: "The Trust Receipts Act has never seemed to me
to be adaptable to floating charge financing or after-acquired property interests."
2 N.Y. LAW RE ISION COMM'N 1954 REPORT, at 1181 (1954).
170. Though daily collection and relending has certain benefits in terms of
ease of payment and monitoring, the comment notes that:
Against these advantages must be set the rather expensive machinery of
separate bank accounts, daily reports, special auditors and other procedures
necessary to make it appear that the financier is getting the proceeds from
the sale of the goods subject to his lien even though on the following day
he loans all or part of the preceding day's collections back to the borrower.
Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 5, at 158 (emphasis supplied). While so-called "lock-box"
arrangements continue to be utilized, these arrangements are implemented as a
control feature in the lending relationship rather than as a requirement for the legal
protections of the secured lender's priority. See generally Scott, supra note 2, at
943-59. Certainly, where a working capital lender is in place, a purchase money
financier of inventory cannot utilize this arrangement.
171. UCC § 302(4) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Sept. 1948), Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 5,
at 134.
172. Id. (emphasis supplied).
173. Id.
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property. 7 4 By definition, it was not possible to have a specific lien
"float" over all inventory, since a prerequisite to its validity as a
specific lien was the inclusion of a "release price" tied to discrete
items of inventory. This was not the case with a general lien that
could attach to after-acquired property. 1" Further, section 314(1)
gave priority to any specific lien that competed with a general lien,
including a general lien that incorporated an after-acquired property
clause. 176 However, the drafters of the Code recognized a problem
in this context:
[11f because of the nature of the goods, a specific lien cannot be
used and the [prior financier] has a general lien, there will be no
way the borrower can get new capital on security of his inventory
without a subordination agreement from the [prior financier].
Advice is requested on the solution of this problem.'
77
Solving this problem involved deletion of the concepts of specific
and general inventory liens, general validation of after-acquired prop-
erty clauses in the inventory setting, and the creation of purchase
money priority.
Although the definition of specific inventory lien excluded after-
acquired property (the trust receipt concept being the model),17 1 the
drafters realized that the nature of inventory financing generally
resulted in an on-going financing relationship. 79 Accordingly, not-
withstanding the prohibition on after-acquired property, section 308180
did permit later advances to be secured by all collateral in debtor's
possession at the time of the latter advance so long as subsequent
advances were made in good faith, and the original contract provided
for such subsequent advances in the ordinary course. Subsequent
acquisitions of collateral, however, did not secure prior advances.
174. UCC § 308(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Sept. 1948), Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 5,
at 137.
175. UCC § 308(1) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Sept. 1948), Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 5,
at 137.
176. UCC § 314(1) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Sept., 1948), Kelly, Drafts, Vol.
5, at 141.
177. UCC § 301 comment 4 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Sept., 1948), Kelly,
Drafts, Vol. 5, at 163. (Emphasis supplied.)
178. UCC § 308 comment (Tentative Draft No. 2, Sept., 1948), Kelly, Drafts,
Vol. 5, p. 168.
179. See Tentative Draft No. 2, Sept. 1948, Introductory Comments, Kelly,
Drafts, Vol. 5, at 156-58. "A common practice in trust receipt financing is a contract
providing for continuous financing of new units of inventory with each trust receipt
securing the new advance plus all that went before." UCC § 308 comment, Kelly,
Drafts, Vol. 5, at 169; See Gilmore quotation, supra note 169; Gilmore, supra note
21, at 1380-81.
180. UCC § 308(2) and comment (Tentative Draft No. 2 September 1948,
Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 5 at 137.
[Vol.. 57
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY
These provisions reveal the drafters' recognition of the limited
availability of the specific lien where inventory is "in bulk" and not
discrete and identifiable, and that inventory financing is conducted
generally on an on-going basis.181 The question became how to best
address these characteristics of inventory financing so as to protect
the interests of the debtor, the secured party, and other creditors.
The September 1949 Revisions of the May 1949 Draft marked a
major shift in response to these problems. The September Revisions
deleted the distinction between the general inventory lien and the
specific inventory lien and, at the same time, provided a specific
definition of, and rules relating to, PMSIs. 8 2 It was also in the
September Revisions that the drafters adopted a unified approach to
all security interests, with special rules for particular collateral.'83 For
the first time, section 8-202 specifically validated the after-acquired
property clause as a general proposition, with certain restrictions that
have not survived to the current Code.'8 4 Section 8-202 validated the
after-acquired property clause generally with respect to inventory,
without exception based upon the type of inventory involved, specific
or general. Finally, the general framework for priorities among
competing interests in inventory was set forth in section 8-406, with
priority being accorded the PMSI.
8 5
c. New Value and the Purchase Money Security Interest
While the efficacy and scope of a floating lien in inventory was
initially of some concern to the drafters, the preference to be accorded
"new value" obligations was never in doubt. In the Introductory
Comment to Tentative Draft No. 1, the drafters stated:
1It seemed desirable to make one basic division to run throughout
the article. That division is to distinguish the security transaction
where security is taken to secure some performance that resulted in
a current addition to the borrower's assets and well-being from that
in which the security is taken solely to better an existing creditor's
position in relation to other existing creditors. This is the new value
old value distinction found in the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. In
its simplest form it is the purchase money mortgage contrasted with
the security belatedly obtained by an unsecured creditor.
This distinction is justified. The objective of the Commercial
Code is to unify laws dealing with commerce. Security transactions
which facilitate the distribution of goods should be the focus of
our consideration. This is, of course, the secured commercial trans-
181. See supra notes 166-80 and accompanying text.
182. UCC § 8-105(3)(a) (Sept. 1949 Revisions), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 8, at 292.
183. UCC § 8-102 (Sept. 1949 Revisions), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 8, at 283-84.
184. UCC § 8-202 (Sept. 1949 Revisions), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 8, at 307-08.
185. UCC § 8-406 (Sept. 1949 Revisions), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 8, at 341-42.
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action that facilitates purchase of goods and services-the old
conditional sale contract, the purchase mortgage and the trust
receipt ...
.. . [W]e have eliminated the old value mortgage from the picture
so that validation of the mortgage on the stock in trade or the
inventory exists only as to new value.
86
Obviously, the sentiment in the last sentence has not continued
through the drafts of the Code. 8 7 These comments, however, can be
viewed as setting the course for the future drafts of the Code. The
very strong preference for new value obligations is clearly manifest
and continues throughout the drafts of the Code. In the second
comment to section 8-105 of the September 1949 Revisions, wherein
PMSI is defined, the drafters state that "[u]nder existing rules
purchase money obligations have an advantage over other obliga-
tions. . . . This preference for such obligations is continued in this
Article."' In the comment to section 8-108, relating to the definition
of new value, the drafters note:
This Article does not so limit [as did the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act] the security interests permitted to those given for new value.
It does however in some instances give preferred treatment to
interests in property obtained for new advances or on new acqui-
sitions by the borrower. The theory of this distinction is that a
lender who brings new assets to the borrower is entitled to better
treatment than a creditor who merely improves his position with
reference to other creditors. 89
Although the definition of new value was deleted in the May 1950
Draft, the preference for new value (purchase money) obligations
continued through all the drafts of the Code.' 9°
With the May 1950 Draft, the basic outline of the provisions
relating to PMSIs and priorities was established. The definition of
PMSI in section 9-107 of the May 1950 Draft is substantially the
same as the current definition, with the exception that, in the
Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Draft, the drafters deleted the conclu-
sive presumption relating to the tracing of value.' 9' The reason for
the deletion was that it went beyond the common law. 192 Further,
186. Introductory Comment (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 1948), Kelly, Drafts
Vol. 4, at 286, 288.
187. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
188. UCC § 8-105 comment (Sept. 1949 Revisions), Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 8, at
293.
189. UCC § 8-108 comment (Sept. 1949 Revisions), Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 8, at
300.
190. See UCC § 9-107 comment 1 and § 9-108 comment 2 (1987).
191. Compare UCC § 9-107 (May 1950 Draft), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 11, at 218
with U.C.C. § 9-107 (1987), quoted in text accompanying supra note 77.
192. UCC § 9-107 comment (Supp. No. I to 1952 Official Draft), Kelly,
Drafts, Vol. 17, at 382-83. See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
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while the definition of new value was deleted in the May 1950 Draft,
the preferred treatment for PMSIs as new value obligations contin-
ued. Comment 2 to section 9-108 of the May 1950 Draft states,
'Purchase money security interests' . . . are by definition new value
obligations, and the preferred treatment given such interests is indic-
ative of the approach of this Article."' 93
2. The Later Drafts
The importance of the Tentative Drafts and the 1949 Drafts of
the Code lies in the fundamental policy formulations they establish.
Beginning with Proposed Final Draft No. 1, in May 1950, the drafters
began the process of revising and fine tuning the actual provisions
of Article 9. As noted, the basic definition of PMSI appeared in the
September 1949 Revisions of the May 1949 Draft, as did the principal
validating provisions relating to after-acquired property. 94 Finally,
the fundamental requirements for priority of the PMSI in inventory
were established in section 9-312(2) of the May 1950 Draft. 195
With the May 1950 Draft, the drafters established a firm foun-
dation for a unified approach to the body of chattel security law
and the terms for the classification of collateral along functional
lines. This was a critical development and the current Code has
changed little in this regard from May 1950.196 This approach makes
clear the intention of the drafters to treat all security interests in a
uniform manner, except where it is necessary to make specific rules
for specific types of collateral, in order to accommodate the necessary
protection of the debtor, secured party, and other creditors in accord
with the realities of commercial finance.
In this regard, the following points are worth noting. First, from
the earliest drafts, the definition of PMSI made no distinction
between the types of collateral involved.' 97 Equally important, the
193. UCC § 9-108 comment 2 (May 1950 Draft), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 11, at
220; see Gilmore quote, supra note 108.
194. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
195. UCC § 9-312 and comments (May 1950 Draft), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 11, at
269-73. While § 9-312, the basic priority provision of Article 9, has been revised
more extensively than perhaps any other provision in Article 9, the basic concepts
underlying the priority of PMSIs in inventory appeared as early as the May 1950
draft, to-wit, prior filing and notice to other secured parties. Indeed, as early as
the September 1949 Revisions, the concept of prior notice for purchase money
priority in inventory appeared. See UCC § 8-406(2) (Sept. 1949 Revisions), Kelly,
Drafts, Vol. 8, at 342-43.
196. See supra note 160.
197. UCC § 9-107 (1951 Text edition) provides:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it
is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or a
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draft provisions relating to after-acquired property and future ad-
vances similarly made no distinctions in the area of inventory col-
lateral or between a general security interest and a PMSI. 198 The only
pertinent area in which the drafters created a distinction on the basis
of inventory collateral relates to the requirements for obtaining a
valid purchase money priority under section 9-312.199 Indeed, these
requirements support the thesis that holders of PMSIs in inventory
are entitled to the benefits of the floating lien so long as all debt
and all collateral are in fact purchase money."
The evolution of the provisions relating to after-acquired property
and future advances demonstrates the validity of such provisions in
the purchase money context. The distinction in the earlier drafts
between the specific lien, as to which after-acquired property could
not be included, and the general lien, as to which such property
could be included, was abandoned.20 l Having dropped the model of
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, the drafters moved to a general
floating lien on inventory. At the same time the drafters added the
specific concept of a PMSI. 2 2 While the provisions relating to after-
part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an
obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use
of collateral if such value is in fact so used; or
(c) taken by a person who for the purpose of enabling the debtor to
pay for or acquire rights in or the use of collateral makes advances or
incurs an obligation not more than ten days before or after the debtor
receives possession of the collateral even though the value given is not in
fact used to pay the price.
Kelly, Drafts Vol. 12, at 270-71. A comparison to UCC § 9-107 (1987), see supra
text accompanying note 77, demonstrates that, with the exception of the deletion
of subparagraph (c) by Supp. No. 1 to the 1952 Draft, see infra notes 204-08 and
accompanying text, the definition above and the definition in the current Code are
identical.
198. See UCC § 9-203 (May 1950 Draft), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 11, at 229; U.C.C
§ 9-204 (Spring 1951 Draft), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 12, at 275-76; U.C.C § 9-204 (1952
Official Draft), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 15, at 216-17; UCC § 9-204 (1957 Official Draft),
Kelly, Drafts, Vol 20, at 155-56; and U.C.C. § 9-204 (1987), quoted at supra note
84.
With the exception of security interests in consumer goods (and, formerly, farm
goods), any collateral may be subject to inclusion under an after-acquired property
clause, and there is no distinction between a general security interest and a PMSI.
See Hogan, supra note 85.
199. Compare UCC §§ 9-107 and 9-108 (1987)(defining PMSI and setting forth
when after-acquired collateral is not security for an antecedent debt) with UCC §
9-312 (3)-(5) (1987) (priorities among conflicting security interests in same collateral).
200. See supra text accompanying note 36.
201. See supra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
202. Professor Gilmore, admitting dissatisfaction with the priority provisions
in the Code that the N.Y. Law Revision Commission was considering, stated: "I
think some provision like 9-312(4) giving purchase money interests priority over
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acquired property expressly limited the ability to encumber after-
acquired property in the context of consumer goods and crops, no
such limitation was placed upon inventory collateral or purchase
money interests in collateral. 23 The lack of any limitation in section
9-204 with respect to inventory collateral or PMSI's, coupled with
the fact that inventory financing is normally conducted on an on-
going basis, leads to the conclusion that the drafters did not intend
the inclusion of after-acquired property or future advance clauses or
both in PMSIs to affect the priority or validity of such interests.
Much has been made of the deletion of subparagraph (c) of
section 9-107,204 in the Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Draft. Sub-
paragraph (c) provided a conclusive presumption concerning the use
of proceeds to acquire collateral. 205 The reason for the deletion was
to return to the concept of purchase money interests that existed at
common law. 206 Professor Lloyd's analysis of the development of the
purchase money concept at common law 2 7 indicates that, at common
after-acquired interests is essential .... I think the basic idea of the subsection is
correct and is indeed necessary. It is an integral part of this whole floating charge
set-up." 2 N.Y. LAW REVIsION COMM'N 1954 REPORT, at 1184 (1954).
203. See sections cited supra note 198; Hogan, supra note 85.
204. See, Hansford, supra note 28, at 259 n.96; Lloyd, supra note 44, at 40-
41.
205. UCC § 9-107(c) provided:
A security interest is a 'purchase money security interest' to the extent that
it is .... (c) taken by a person who for the purpose of enabling the debtor
to pay for or acquire rights in or the use of collateral makes advances or
insures an obligation not more than ten days before or after the debtor
receives possession of the collateral even though the value given is not in
fact used to pay the price.
UCC § 9-107 and Reason for Change (Supp. No. 1 to 1952 Draft), Kelly, Drafts,
Vol. 17, at 383.
206. The subcommittee on Article 9 and the Editorial Board have con-
cluded that subparagraph (c) extends the purchase money concept too far.
In addition the subparagraph creates very difficult problems in the deter-
mination of priorities between conflicting security interests since it makes
priorities in affected cases depend upon the accident of whose money, as
between competing secured parties, was actually used. Consequently, the
Board voted to delete the subparagraph.
UCC § 9-107 (Supp. No. 1, Reason), Kelly, Drafts Vol. 17, at 383.
Professor Lloyd makes the following observations regarding interpretation of
the drafters' intent in deleting subparagraph (c): "As is often the case, one can
interpret the drafters' action as supporting whichever side of the issue one happens
to be on. On the one hand, it can be argued that the fact the drafters tinkered with
the purchase money concept at all indicates an intent to redefine the concept ....
On the other hand, it can be argued that the drafters' deletion of their innovation
and their retreat to a definition that does nothing more than restate the common
law concept in the most general terms shows an intent to retain and incorporate the
common law concept. Perhaps a better explanation is that subsection (c) did not
change the concept of purchase money but merely created a rule of tracing." Lloyd,
supra note 44, at 41.
207. Lloyd, supra note 44, at 10-37.
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law, the priority of the PMSI extended to after-acquired purchase
money collateral. 208 So long as the purchase money party identifies
the purchase money collateral retained by the debtor and proves the
amount and character of the outstanding purchase money obligations,
the PMSI should be afforded priority. 209 The precise one-to-one
correlation of debt to collateral required by the transformation rule
as adopted in Southtrust is not required.
The evolution of the requirements for obtaining purchase money
priority in inventory further confirms that the purchase money in-
ventory financier is entitled to obtain the benefit of after-acquired
(purchase money) collateral. In Supplement No. I to the 1952 Draft,
the drafters eliminated from the requisite notice to be given by the
purchase money inventory financier, the reference to the amount of
the interest to be acquired.2 10 Earlier drafts required the purchase
money financier to advise the prior financier of the amount of the
purchase money interest to be obtained.2 11 The deletion does not
affect the prior financier, since by giving notice of the types of
inventory, as to which the prior financier is not entitled to rely,212
the purpose of the notice is fulfilled and the prior financier is given
the means to protect its interest."' By deleting the amount require-
ment from the notice, the prior financier loses no ability to monitor
the actual situation, while the deletion promotes flexibility between
the debtor and purchase money financier by permitting them to
structure and adjust their financing relationship to meet unforeseen
needs and circumstances. 4
208. Professor Lloyd demonstrates that, at common law, the courts manifested
a desire to preserve purchase money status to the extent possible where the same
collateral secured both purchase money debt and non-purchase money debt. Ac-
cordingly, the courts adopted the "dual status" rule allowing purchase money debt
to retain priority while subordinating non-purchase money debt. The common law
courts did not automatically destroy the purchase money priority where non-purchase
money debt was also secured by purchase money collateral. This clear bias in favor
of the purchase money party results in a finding that, so long as purchase money
debt was secured by purchase money collateral (albeit possibly different purchase
money collateral than gave rise to the specific outstanding purchase money debt),
the courts would uphold the priority of the purchase money party. See Lloyd, supra
note 44, at 36 n.174 and accompanying text. "[W]hat emerges from the cases is the
sense that the courts would adopt whatever theory would best protect the purchase
money lender, and they would bend that theory as far as it had to be bent to
accomplish this objective." Id. at 37.
209. See infra Part VI.
210. Compare UCC § 9-312(4) (1952 Draft), Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 15, at 263,
with UCC § 9-312(3) (Supp. No. 1 1952) Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 17, at 393.
211. See UCC § 9-312(2)(b) (1950 Proposed Final Draft); Kelly, Drafts, Vol.
11, at 269.
212. See infra Part VI.
213. UCC § 9-312, comment 3 (1987).
214. See infra Part V.C.
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Additional flexibility in the on-going relationship between debtor
and purchase money financier occurred through the 1972 amendments
to Article 9 which clarified that the notice given by the purchase
money financier was effective for a period of five years.2 15 If a one-
shot transaction was anticipated, certainly a five-year period of
effectiveness was not needed. Only in the context of an on-going
financing relationship, which, given the nature of inventory, requires
the efficacy of after-acquired collateral, does a five year period of
effectiveness make sense.
Analysis of the state of pre-Code law together with close study
of prior drafts of the Code, strongly reinforces the broad construction
of the current Code advocated herein for validating the floating lien
in the context of PMSIs in inventory. From the outset, the drafters
manifested the purpose to simplify the area of chattel security in
harmony with commercial practice of their day.21 6 This required the
validation of the after-acquired property clause, not necessarily on
the basis of policy, but on the ground that the floating lien was a
fait accompli that was available to those parties intent on acquiring
its benefits. Given this state of affairs, the drafters proceeded to
provide the borrower with the means of avoiding the potential
stranglehold by the general financier, made possible by the validation
of the floating lien. The purchase money priority developed at
common law as a counter-weight to the after-acquired property clause
and was warmly embraced by the drafters. 21 7 The purposes, policies
and objectives of the drafters in validating the after-acquired property
clause and adopting the strong preference for new value, purchase
money obligations demonstrate that the restrictive scope given to
purchase money interests by the court in Southtrust is completely
unwarranted. Further support for the proposition that the transfor-
mation rule gives unduly narrow scope to the operation of purchase
money interests in inventory derives from equitable and normative
considerations that supplement the Code, as well as from the nature
of inventory finance as an on-going, relational form of financing.
V. BEYOND TEXT, COMMENT, AND HISTORY
As shown in Parts III and IV, the text and comments of the
Code and the historical antecedents thereto demonstrate that the
drafters intended to accord the PMSI in inventory all of the benefits
of the floating lien as it related to purchase money collateral. The
view that obtaining and maintaining a PMSI in inventory is wholly
215. UCC § 9-312(3) (1972 Official Text), Reason for 1972 Change (2)(a). See
Hogan quote, supra note 96.
216. Part IV.B.I.a., supra.
217. See supra note 135 and 140 and accompanying text.
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consistent with the inclusion of an after-acquired property or future
advance clause derives additional support from the writings of Pro-
fessors Summers,"' Barnes 2 9 and Scott. 2 0 Professor Summers iden-
tifies a number of equitable principles that, when applied pursuant
to section 1-103 to supplement the Code provisions relating to the
floating lien and PMSIs in inventory, demonstrates the propriety of
the broad construction advocated herein.22 l Similarly, Professor Barnes'
proposed methodology for interpretation and construction of the
provisions of the Code, which gives effect to fundamental premises
and principles underlying the overall functioning of specific Code
provisions, reinforces the thesis that the drafters intended to validate
the floating lien in the purchase money context. 22 Finally, Professor
Scott has put forth an economic justification for the value of secured
debt. 223 This justification is entirely consistent with the proposition
that inventory financing, whether on a general or purchase money
basis, results in an on-going relationship between the debtor and the
financier that can only be accomplished through the validation of
the floating, blanket lien in the purchase money context.
A. Equitable Principles, the Floating Lien, and the Purchase
Money Security Interest in Inventory
Section 1-103 provides that principles of law and equity outside
the Code, "unless displaced," supplement the provisions of the
Code .24 Professor Summers identifies numerous equitable principles
that are not displaced by specific Code provisions and that inform
the construction of the Code. 225 Of particular relevance to the present
discussion are the equitable principles of comparative diligence, and
the related anti-windfall and unjust enrichment principles.
226
218. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 72 Nw. L. REv. 906 (1978).
219. Barnes, supra note 53.
220. Scott, supra note 2.
221. Summers, supra note 218, at 913-27, 945-46.
222. Barnes, supra note 53.
223. Scott, supra note 2.
224. UCC § 1-103 (1987) provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity
to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplement its provisions.
225. Summers, supra note 218, at 913-923.
226. See, id. at 920-23. Professor Lloyd demonstrates in his article that such
equitable principles provided the early rationale for the common law protections
accorded the purchase money priority. "In the early decisions, the courts openly
acknowledged they were basing their decision on general considerations of fairness
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One author, approving the result reached by the court in South-
trust, concludes that "[tihe courts should give the subsection 9-312(3)
PMSI a narrow scope. ' 227 Yet, even if one accepts the technical,
narrow construction of the purchase money provisions of the Code
applied by the court in Southtrust, the result obtained in that case
was inequitable. From the opinion in that case, 22  Borg-Warner
and equity, preferring the lender who had parted with her money over the spouse
or creditor looking for a windfall." Lloyd, supra note 44, at 37. See also id. at 47
(discussing general equitable theory as it applies to the proper construction of
purchase money interests under the Code).
227. See Hansford, supra note 28, at 263. Professor Hansford, while approving
the result in Southtrust, criticizes the court's analysis Id. at 258.
228. The discussion of the Southtrust case in this Article is based upon the
official opinion published by the court. See 760 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1985). The
court sets the factual setting of the conflict between Southtrust and Borg-Warner
as follows:
Both the Bank [Southtrust] and BWAC [Borg-Warner] have perfected
security interests in the inventory of the debtors. In each case, the Bank
filed its financing statement first. BWAC contends that as a purchase
money lender it falls within the purchase money security interest exception
to the first to file rule and therefore is entitled to possession of the
inventory.
Id. at 1241.
Because the court went on to hold that the exercise by Borg-Warner of the
after-acquired property and future advance clauses contained in its security agreement
"transformed" Borg-Warner's security interest into a non-purchase money security
interest junior in priority to that of Southtrust, the court did not analyze the issues
relating to Borg-Warner's satisfaction of the procedural requirements of § 9-312(3).
Id. at 1243. Nor did the court analyze the composition of the debt owed to Borg-
Warner in terms of purchase money versus non-purchase money obligations. Id.
Southtrust claimed to have "no record" of receiving the requisite notification
relating to two of the four debtors financed by Southtrust and Borg-Warner. Brief
of Appellee at 10, Southtrust Bank of Ala., Nat'l Ass'n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance
Corp., 760 F. 2d 1240 (lth Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief]. Further,
Southtrust raised factual issues concerning the nature of the debt outstanding to
Borg-Warner. Southtrust asserted that a portion of the debt was not purchase
money, that Borg-Warner had engaged in questionable bookkeeping practices in-
cluding the issuance of "dummy" invoices by suppliers of the inventory financed
by Borg-Warner, in order to give the appearance that all outstanding debt resulted
in the acquisition of new assets, when, in fact, the original acquisition debt had
been fully paid and the existing debt amounted to new, non-purchase money
advances. Appellee's Brief, at 10-13. See, Aronov, supra note 21, at 31-33.
Whether such factors affected the court's judgment is not known. From the
opinion it appears that Borg-Warner, by the terms of the security agreement,
attempted to secure all indebtedness owing to it by the debtors (both purchase
money and non-purchase money) with all inventory at any time financed by Borg-
Warner. Southtrust, supra at 1241-42. It also appears from the opinion that Borg-
Warner advanced only purchase money debt. Accordingly, what appears from the
published opinion is a situation in which a purchase money financier of inventory
attempted to secure all purchase money obligations with all purchase money collateral
in a pooling arrangement. The issue addressed by the court was directed at the
efficacy of this concept. The court stated "the key issue for decision by this Court
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advanced credit, on various occasions, which enabled the debtors to
acquire inventory assets. 229 Borg-Warner complied with the notifica-
tion and perfection requirements of section 9-312(3) and obtained a
perfected PMSI in the debtors' inventory. 20 The opinion gives no
indication that any of the indebtedness owed to Borg-Warner was
other than purchase money obligations, nor that Borg-Warner claimed
as security any assets other than purchase money collateral.2 11 Solely
as a result of Borg-Warner's inability to match, on a one-to-one
basis, the collateral to the indebtedness advanced specifically for that
collateral, Southtrust, as general financier, obtained priority to col-
lateral to which it made no contribution.
232
In comparing the diligence of the parties in protecting their
respective interests, clearly Borg-Warner had done all that the Code
required by informing Southtrust of its purchase money position.
23
Thereafter, Borg-Warner presumably monitored its collateral and
kept accounts of the outstanding balance of the credit advanced to
enable the borrowers to acquire such collateral. It does not appear
is whether inclusion of an after-acquired property clause and a future advances
clause in BWAC's security agreements converted its purchase money security interest
(PMSI) into an ordinary security interest." Southtrust, 760 F.2d at 1242.
The court held that "a floating lien is inconsistent with a PMSI. A PMSI
requires a one-to-one relationship between the debt and the collateral." Id. at 1243.
The broad, categorical treatment of the facts by the Court in Southtrust requires
that any analysis of the rule established by that case must proceed from the published
opinion, notwithstanding apparent factual issues raised by the parties which may
have justified the result in that case for reasons other than those stated by the
court.
229. Southtrust, 760 F.2d at 1241-43.
230. Id.
231. But see supra note 228, regarding alleged factual discrepancies not ad-
dressed by the Court.
232. Southtrust, 760 F.2d at 1243.
233. Obviously, if the rule set forth in Southtrust represents the proper
construction of the PMSI in inventory, Borg-Warner failed to match the outstanding
debt to the collateral on a one-to-one basis. However, such tracing is required to
maintain the purchase money priority when a conflict occurs. The comparative
diligence principle looks to the ability of the parties, through their own actions, to
avoid the resulting loss in the first place. See Summers supra note 218, at 921. The
question of comparative diligence relates to which party, through a lack of diligence,
was responsible for the loss. Where lenders incur losses on secured debts, the loss
is occasioned by the lack of collateral to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness at the
time of default/liquidation of the debtor. With respect to a general financier's loss
in such a case, the purchase money financier has no control over the actions of the
general financier in monitoring and supervising its loans to the debtor. The loss
suffered by the general financier results from the general financier's failure to
diligently monitor and supervise its loans to the debtor. Any loss suffered by the
purchase money financier is similarly a result of the actions and diligence exercised
by the purchase money financier. Therefore, it is the case that the purchase money
financier's lack of diligence in not tracing loans and collateral on a one-to-one basis
is not the cause of any loss otherwise incurred by the general financier.
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from the case, or from the record, that Southtrust made any advances
against the inventory claimed by Borg-Warner. In any event, South-
trust was on notice2 14 that Borg-Warner claimed a prior PMSI in the
items of collateral; more importantly, Southtrust was in a position
to monitor the debtor to assure that it made no advances against
such collateral. 235 Apparently Southtrust was content to allow Borg-
Warner to finance the debtor's inventory acquisitions and only when
the debtors' assets following insolvency proved insufficient to satisfy
the indebtedness owing to Southtrust, did it assert priority in the
assets financed by Borg-Warner by claiming that Borg-Warner had
lost its purchase money priority. What appears is the classic case of
the prior secured lender with an after-acquired property clause, which
failed to monitor the debtor and relied instead on its prior position
as the first to file. Had Southtrust exercised diligence in monitoring
its debtor, it may have been possible to have avoided any loss.
However, nothing Borg-Warner could have done could have avoided
the collateral shortfall experienced by Southtrust. 236 Applying the
theory of comparative diligence, 23 7 Borg-Warner should not have
been penalized for a loss that Southtrust, through monitoring and
surveillance of the debtors, was in a better position to avoid.
The related anti-windfall and unjust enrichment principles are
even more significant in analyzing the proper treatment of the floating
lien in the context of purchase money priority. Professor Summers
sums up the anti-windfall principle: "other things being equal, one
party should not realize an unearned gain at another's expense,
especially where the other is a deserving party. '238 The concept of
purchase money priority is bottomed on this fundamental equitable
conclusion. 2 9 From the beginning, the drafters sought "to distinguish
the security transaction where security is taken to secure some per-
formance that resulted in a current addition to the borrower's assets
and well-being from that in which the security is taken solely to
better an existing creditor's position in relation to other existing
creditors. ' ' 240 Such is precisely the case in Southtrust.24' Through
advances to the debtors, Borg-Warner made "current additions to
234. But see supra note 228.
235. UCC § 9-312, comment 3 (1987).
236. See supra notes 88 and 212-215 and accompanying text.
237. Id.
238. Summers, supra note 218, at 921.
239. See Lloyd, supra note 44, at 16, 22 and 37. "Professor Glen states that
the purchase money priority 'is merely another working of the principle that prevents
unjust enrichment by means of another man's money."' Id. at 16; see notes 188-
89, supra and accompanying text.
240. Kelly, Drafts, Vol. 4, at 286 (Comment to Tentative Draft No. 1 - Article
VII (1948)).
241. 760 F.2d 1241.
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the borrower's assets and well being. 1 2 4 2 The security interest asserted
by Southtrust against Borg-Warner amounted to security "taken
solely to better [Southtrust's] position in relation to [Borg-Warner]."
Southtrust clearly acquired an unwarranted windfall in the form of
the assets supplied to the borrowers with Borg-Warner's money.
Application of the anti-windfall principle would have resulted in an
equitable interpretation of the purchase money provisions in that
case. If, as appears from the opinion, 243 all of the debt advanced by
Borg-Warner was used by the debtors to acquire inventory, then all
inventory that had been acquired with such advances and which was
available at the time of the debtors' liquidation properly should have
been viewed as security for such indebtedness. While Southtrust likely
advanced money to the debtors for rent, payroll and other nonac-
quisition costs of running a business (amounts that are admittedly
of value to the debtors), Southtrust did so with notice that Borg-
Warner was financing acquisitions of particular inventory. 42" Accord-
ingly, Southtrust was not entitled to rely on such assets as security
for its nonpurchase money advances. 245 By awarding priority to
Southtrust the court awarded Southtrust an unjustified windfall of
additional collateral as to which Southtrust was not entitled to rely
and did not make any contribution toward acquisition.
B. Normative Principles in the Interpretation of the Purchase
Money Priority in Inventory
In proposing a "normative framework" for code interpretation,
Professor Barnes posits a hierarchy of values and goals to be achieved
by the Code and discusses the derivative rules giving effect to such
values. 24 Professor Barnes asserts that "fairness" in dealings between
commercial parties is a "[flundamental value" that the drafters
intended to advance.2 47 He argues that the rules of notice contained
242. See supra note 228, regarding the discrepancy in the facts concerning the
nature (purchase money or non-purchase money) of the debt owed to Borg-Warner,
as appears in the briefs of the parties. However, in the reported opinion no such
discrepancy appears.
243. 760 F.2d at 1241.
244. Id. at 1241-43.
245. Of course, if Southtrust also advanced funds for the acquisition of
inventory it would retain priority in such inventory as it, in fact, financed. See infra
note 255.
246. The fundamental values discussed by Professor Barnes are similar to
certain equitable principles discussed by Professor Summers. However, Professor
Barnes' analysis proceeds from those values he views to have been motivating factors
in the drafters' construct of the Code, rather than supplemental principles left by
the drafters to augment later construction of the Code. Barnes, supra note 53, at
119-122.
247. Barnes, supra note 53, at 155-57.
[Vol. 57
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY
in Article 9 are derivative of, and constitute the means by which the
drafters implemented, this fundamental value.2 48 By providing notice
to the world of the state of the debtor's financial affairs, fairness
between comleting creditors is furthered.249
Professor Barnes' article deals principally with conflicts arising
between the provisions of Article 2 and Article 9.250 His normative
construct is intended to provide a method for determining the weight
to be given to the values in each Article when conflicts arise .2 1
Specifically, Professor Barnes addresses the conflict between the
reclaiming seller under sections 2-702 and 2-507 and the secured party
claiming the sold goods under an after-acquired property clause.
252
His comments regarding this conflict are relevant to the conflict
between the purchase money financier and the "floating lienor"
under Article 9. He states:
Given the straightforward equities of a true owner who produced
or used capital to acquire the goods she sold and a floating lienor
who is not advancing new funds, the true owner is in a far stronger
position. 253
To characterize the true owner's interest as creating an ostensible
ownership problem is to demand that every seller, in every sales
transaction, file a financing statement on the unlikely chance that
some breakdown will occur [Citation to section 9-312(3) and (4)].
This seems excessive in the light of the general financer's lack of
reliance. We certainly have not advanced the marketplace by making
transactions more certain or more easily or cheaply concluded by
requiring what will almost always be nugatory notice.
254
Applied to the purchase money financer, the same considerations are
relevant. First, the purchase money financier supplies new value to
the borrower's enterprise. 255 Certainly the party that expends capital
and other resources to enable the debtor to acquire inventory is in
248. Id.
249. See Id.
250. Barnes, supra note 53.
251. Id. at 173.
252. Barnes supra note 53, at 173.
253. Id. at 173.
254. Id. at 174 (emphasis supplied).
255. Gilmore, supra note 21, at 1376. To the extent that the prior financier
also provides advances which enable the debtor to acquire the asset, the prior
financier will also be a purchase money financier and will be entitled to priority
under the general priority provision of § 9-312(5). Id. This is the case since the
purchase money financier cannot prove purchase money debt which is entitled to
priority beyond the amount actually used by the debtor to acquire the asset. As to
the balance, the prior financier retains priority under the first to file rule. See John
Deere Co. v. Production Credit Ass'n of Murfreesboro, 39 UCC Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 684 (Tenn. Ct. App., 1984).
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a better position, as a matter of fairness and equity, than the party
reaping the benefits of another's labor (or in this case, capital) while
doing nothing.
The fundamental value of fairness is reflected through the notice
provisions of section 9-312(3). Upon receipt of the purchase money
notice, the prior financier acquires knowledge of the situation and
the ability to protect its interest. Accordingly, as the drafters in-
tended, the prior financier will "presumably not make" further
advances against the purchase money inventory. 2 6 So long as the
notice provides sufficient information to enable the prior financier
to reasonably identify the collateral provided by the purchase money
financier, any requirement of subsequent notice is redundant. 2 7 In-
deed, as noted,258 the 1972 amendments clarified the durational effect
of such notice, indicating that the drafters contemplated on-going,
repeat transactions. 219 By limiting the efficacy of on-going purchase
money transactions in inventory it cannot be said that commerce has
been made more certain or more easily and cheaply concluded.2 6
C. Relational Theory and the Purchase Money Security Interest in
Inventory
In a recent article, Professor Scott proposed a relational theory
of secured financing in a search for an economic justification of the
priority scheme of Article 9.261 Professor Scott concludes by noting:
All of the hypotheses that seek to explain secured financing are
grounded in the belief that persistent institutional regularities rest
on purposive foundations .... Frequently, insight comes only
through the accreting effects of successive scholarly efforts. By
building on these efforts, I have proposed a relational theory that
purports to supply a coherent explanation of a dominant pattern
of secured financing.
262
While the scholarship relating to the economic justifications for
secured credit2 63 has certainly shed much light on secured credit, the
256. UCC § 9-312, comment 3 (1987).
257. As noted, supra note 94 and accompanying text, the requisite notice
under § 9-312(3)(c) is effective for 5 years. Mandating "update" notices, not required
by the Code, for each shipment, would impose a time consuming burden on the
purchase money financier, without any offsetting benefit to the prior financier. By
virtue of the original notice, the prior financier receives sufficient information to
enable it to monitor the debtor and identify that inventory on which it has no right
to rely.
258. See note 215 supra and accompanying text.
259. Hogan, supra note 96.
260. See supra Part III.A.1.; see also Barnes, supra note 53, at 174.
261. Scott, supra note 2.
262. Id. at 970.
263. See supra note 8.
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data compiled by Professor Scott and his relational theory provide
the most satisfying explanation of commercial secured credit in light
of the existing reality.
2 64
Professor Scott sets out six "properties of secured loans.
'26
1
First, the borrower generally has a particular growth prospect that
is unique to the firm. 266 The borrower is also positioned such that
the market for financing, other than through the medium of secured
credit, is unavailable. 267 The nature of the growth opportunity is such
that an exclusive financier must be employed and given the ability
to exercise leverage and discretion in the development of the pro-
ject. 268 The use of the blanket lien on all assets assures this exclusivity
and leverage and facilitates the financier's ability to police the bor-
rower's development of the project. 269 Finally, the borrower's size is
such that sophisticated financial and investment counseling is not
available to the borrower in the normal course. 20 Accordingly, the
secured financier is often the party that will provide such service to
see that the project is developed to its fullest potential. 271 The
properties of firm-specific growth opportunities, the lack of alter-
native financing, exclusivity, requisite leverage and discretion in the
secured party, the policing function and financial counseling services
are derived from an impressive collection of data compiled by Pro-
fessor Scott.
272
Professor Scott proceeds to analyze these characteristics against
the priority scheme of Article 9. The "extraordinary legal protection"
accorded the floating lien under Article 9 allows the general financier
to acquire exclusive control over the entire financing venture of the
borrower. 273 Such control is necessary in light of the general finan-
264. While I am aware that my positive view of Professor Scott's theory may
be viewed as self-serving, inasmuch as his Relational Theory is consistent with the
purposive interpretation of purchase money financing of inventory advocated herein,
I am nonetheless impressed by the overall accuracy of Professor Scott's analysis
when compared to five years of practice representing major national and regional
asset based lenders.
265. Scott, supra note 2, at 936-37.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Scott, supra note 2 at 936-37.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. One example of such financial advice occurred in a transaction in
which the author was involved. The debtor was a closely held family corporation
and had never before borrowed money but instead had funded its operations through
cash flow. Standard procedure by the debtor had been to pay trade payables as
soon as received. The lender provided counseling and systems advice which allowed
the debtor to take the fullest advantage of the grace periods afforded in the trade
payables, thereby improving its cash flow and reducing the costs of borrowed money.
272. Scott, supra note 2, at 938-940 and 971-975 (Appendices).
273. Id. at 953.
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cier's "investment" in the borrower's project. Professor Scott anal-
ogizes this to a prospector in search of gold.274 The general financier
seeks out financing opportunities. In order to develop the opportunity
in a profitable manner for the general financier (as well as for the
borrower), it is necessary to protect the general financier's proprietary
stake in the project. The information obtained by the prospecting
financier is protected, as is its ability to develop the project without
others free-riding on its efforts. The general financier also obtains
the benefits of "repeat" business with the borrower since the rela-
tional aspect of the financing makes the general financier, most
often, the cheapest provider of additional credit. Finally, the blanket
lien not only eases the monitoring burden on the general financier,
but also provides, through the default remedies, a very effective
deterrent to debtor misbehavior. 275 Such an analysis is generally
consistent with the methods and operation of asset based lending.2 76
So the question becomes how the exception in the Code that
gives priority to purchase money financing fits into this scheme.
Professor Scott provides two "plausible hypotheses" to explain this
apparent inconsistency.2 77 First, the drafters considered that one
providing "new money" to an enterprise is to be preferred over one
belatedly taking security to improve its position vis a vis other
creditors. 27 8 The argument proceeds that existing creditors should
have little concern because the collateral for the new money is in
addition to existing collateral. While this is all true enough, 279 Pro-
fessor Scott provides further support by viewing the purchase money
priority as a "bond" against creditor misbehavior. 280 That is, while
the floating lien provides the creditor with protection against debtor
misbehavior, there appears to be no brake against creditor misbe-
havior. In particular, Professor Scott points to "excessive conserva-
tism" on the part of the general financier.
2 81
A secured lender's "excessive conservatism ' 282 derives from the
fact that, at the time the transaction is initially consummated, the
parties have in mind particular projects to be developed. Projects
may subsequently arise that the parties could not anticipate, which
borrower believes will have positive value if properly developed. If
the general financier, however, does not concur in the wisdom of
the new project, out of an abundance of caution and excessive
274. Id. at 955-957.
275. Id. at 957-959.
276. See supra notes 68-70, and accompanying text.
277. Scott, supra note 2, at 962-64.
278. Id. at 962-63.
279. See Kripke, supra note 8 at 962-64.
280. Scott, supra note 2, at 962-63.
281. Id. at 963-64.
282. Id.
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conservatism, 283 the project may go undeveloped. The purchase money
priority offers the borrower a means of acquiring new, limited
financing to develop the new project.
284
A second explanation of the purchase money priority posed by
Professor Scott relates to the nature of the purchase money finan-
cier.285 The purchase money financier may possess particular skills,
not available to the general financier, which permit the-purchase
money financier to monitor the purchase money collateral more
cheaply and/or realize its value on default to a greater degree than
the general financier. 286 For example, a large commercial bank may
have the expertise to generally monitor collateral and develop bor-
rower projects. The purchase money financier, however, may have
particular skills and economies unavailable to the bank by virtue of
the purchase money financier's particular knowledge of the collateral
and its markets. 217 As a result of these particular advantages, the
purchase money financier may be in a position to offer financing of
particular collateral at rates below the bank.
In many cases, the purchase money financier of inventory will
fit nicely into Professor Scott's Relational Theory. The purchase
money financier prospects for outlets for its own products or for
283. See Scott, supra note 2, at 962. Professor Scott notes that the general
financier's rate of return on its investment in the debtor's project is established at
the outset of the transaction. The general financier's incentive is to limit the debtor's
project development to projects which reflect the amount of risk anticipated by the
financier at the inception of the relationship. Id.
284. Id. at 934-36. The possibility exists that the acquisition of inventory on
a purchase money basis may be detrimental to the on-going business of the debtor,
and hence of legitimate concern to the general financier. The acquisition of a new
line of inventory may prove to be an unwise business decision. For example, the
new line proves unpopular and sales of that type of inventory decline, perhaps with
repercussions for related items of inventory. Such decline in sales may greatly
increase the debtor's likelihood of default, not only to the purchase money financier,
but also to the general financier. However, such a scenario can occur in the absence
of any purchase money financier. As Professor Scott points out, lenders will rarely,
and only under extreme circumstances, exercise the type of operational control over
the debtor's business reflected in the decision to change a particular line of inventory.
See, Scott, supra note 2, at 934-936. Accordingly, in most general, working capital
financing arrangements the debtor retains the ability to alter lines of inventory with
the same potential negative effects.
285. Id. at 963.
286. Id. Professor Scott refers to economies of scale possessed by the purchase
money financier due to its specialized expertise in dealing with the financed collateral.
Id.
287. Such expertise and knowledge may facilitate liquidation on default more
quickly and for higher values. For example, in Southtrust, Southtrust surrendered
possession of the collateral to Borg-Warner to allow Borg-Warner to liquidate the
collateral because Borg-Warner "could sell the inventory back to the manufacturers
and distributors [at full invoice price] under [Borg-Warner's] repurchase agreements
[with such parties]." Appellee's Brief, supra note 228, at 14.
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financing opportunities involving products in which it has a particular
expertise. As a result of its expertise with respect to such products,
it can implement more effective monitoring procedures. In addition,
upon default, it can realize higher values by taking and reselling the
inventory in the appropriate market. Yet, the purchase money fin-
ancier also is interested in gaining exclusive control over the borrow-
er's development of the project involving its collateral. The priority
afforded the purchase money financier allows it to exercise greater
control and leverage in the narrow context of its collateral. If the
purchase money financier does not enjoy the benefits of the floating
lien, it is likely that the project will not be fully developed if, indeed,
it is developed at all. 288
Given the particular nature of inventory, the floating lien is
essential. This is no less true for purchase money inventory financing
than for general inventory financing. Without the full benefits of the
floating lien, the PMSI in inventory will be totally ineffective as a
curb to creditor misbehavior or for the purpose of enabling the
borrower to develop projects at the cheapest cost.
VI. APPLICATION: THE FLOATING LIEN AND THE PMSI IN
INVENTORY
Having argued for a broad construction of the PMSI in inventory,
it is necessary to set the parameters of the PMSI in inventory under
such a construction and determine whether such a construction might
have unanticipated negative consequences. In the first instance, the
purchase money financier must have complied with the requirements
for perfection and notice to prior parties set forth in section 9-
312(3).289 Secondly, although a broader concept of "pooling" is
advocated, the purchase money financier is not relieved of the
obligation of proving the extent and use of the obligations secured
or the necessity of identifying the pool of collateral claimed. That
is, while no one-to-one correlation should be required, 219 the purchase
money financier still retains the ultimate burden to establish first
that the obligations/indebtedness sought to be secured by the PMSI
288. See notes 273-76 supra and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 92, § 9-312(3) requires that the purchase money financier
1) perfect its security interest before the debtor receives possession of the inventory
collateral (9-312(3)(a)), 2) give notice to all prior financiers who have filed a financing
statement claiming an interest in the types of collateral which are claimed by the
purchase money financier (9-312(3)(b)), 3) the notice must be received by the prior
financier within 5 years prior to debtor's receipt of the inventory (9-312(3)(c)), and
4) the notice must inform the prior financier that the purchase money financer has
or expects to acquire a PMSI in inventory describing the inventory by item or type.
(9-312(3)(d)).
290. Southtrust, 760 F.2d at 1243.
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are, in fact, all purchase money obligations29' and second that the
collateral claimed as security for the purchase money obligations was
in fact sold by the purchase money financier to the debtor or acquired
by the debtor with purchase money obligations advanced by the
purchase money financier. 292 Once the purchase money financier has
established compliance with the conditions of section 9-312(3) and
the fact that purchase money collateral secures purchase money
obligations, there should be no further requirement to segregate each
item of collateral and relate it to specific items of outstanding
indebtedness.
Assuming that the purchase money financier can establish the
foregoing requirements, it remains to determine whether giving such
scope to the PMSI will have adverse effects on other parties, partic-
ularly prior general financiers relying on after-acquired property
clauses, which are contrary to the scheme of the Code. Although the
Southtrust293 case can properly be called a "model commercial case"
involving the conflict between the PMSI and the prior financier
claiming inventory under an after-acquired property clause, 294 a trans-
action involving "bulk" goods that are more or less fungible will
demonstrate better the problem with a restrictive interpretation of
the PMSI provisions of the Code in the context of inventory fi-
nance. 295 Consider the hypothetical set forth earlier 29 where Borrower
commences business with a line of credit from Local Bank and later
desires to acquire goods from Supplier on a purchase money basis.
The first question involves the solution to the immediate conflict
between Bank and Borrower concerning the propriety of Borrower's
decision to embark on the new line of auto part merchandise. The
first solution that comes to mind requires Borrower completely to
refinance and remove Bank from the picture. This may not be
291. See supra text following note 35 re definition of purchase money obli-
gations. See also supra note 82.
292. That is, that all collateral as to which priority is claimed is purchase
money collateral as defined in text following note 35, supra. This burden is required
by the terms of § 9-107 and the common law construction of the purchase money
priority under pre-Code law. Lloyd, supra note 44, at 37.
293. 760 F.2d 1240.
294. Hansford, supra note 28, at 242.
295. The collateral at issue in the Southtrust case was comprised of large
appliances, e.g., washing machines, dryers, etc. Such items may be specifically
identifiable and capable of one-to-one correlation with the purchase money advance
used to acquire such inventory. See, In re Southern Vt. Supply, Inc., 58 Bankr.
887, (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986). Such a correlation may be feasible today with the use
of computer facilities; but see id. at 894, where computer facilities were insufficient.
Notwithstanding the possibility of such one-to-one correlation utilizing computers,
Article 9 does not require such self-liquidation, and, in any event, such a self-
liquidation requirement is generally impossible with certain "fungible" forms of
collateral. See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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desirable for Borrower for a number of reasons. Prepayment penalties
may have been incorporated into the loan arrangement with Bank.
Further, Borrower will be put to the expense and delay of seeking
and arranging for alternate financing in connection with its general
working capital needs, secured by receivables and equipment and,
perhaps, other inventory. 297 On the other hand, Bank presumably has
a desirable relationship with Borrower as things stand and would
like to continue the status quo. At this point it must be recalled that
at the inception of the loan arrangement between Bank and Borrower,
Bank could have insisted as part of the original loan arrangement,
that Borrower agree to a so-called negative pledge, i.e. a covenant
against incurring any additional indebtedness secured by any collateral
claimed by Bank. 298 In the absence of an effective purchase money
alternative, such a covenant is effectively unnecessary since, by
operation of the narrow scope given the PMSI in inventory, Borrower
is effectively "locked in" to Bank, and subject to the much feared
"stranglehold" on its ability to secure additional/alternative financ-
ing.
29
Assuming that Bank did not protect its own interest at the time
of the initiation of the loan with Borrower through the use of a
negative pledge/covenant against further secured indebtedness, Bor-
rower may have an escape by offering Supplier a PMSI in inventory
provided by that Supplier.3 °° Accordingly, Borrower and Supplier
enter into a purchase money arrangement whereby Supplier agrees
to provide credit of up to $10,000 for the acquisition of belts and
hoses manufactured by X Corporation (hereinafter "X Corp."). Each
item of the proposed inventory collateral has a small value (under
$25.00), and, with respect to each kind of belt or hose, is generally
fungible with others of the same make and size.
Supplier duly notifies Bank that "it has or expects to acquire a
PMSI in all belts and hoses manufactured by X Corp., which may
be, at any time, acquired by Borrower with funds, loans or other
advances provided by Supplier" 0' 1 and duly perfects its security
interest in such collateral prior to the first shipment to the Borrower.
297. For a discussion of the problems and costs associated with a complete
refinancing of the prior lender, see Scott, supra note 2, at 955 n.192 and 962-63.
298. Id. See WEST'S LEGAl. FoRMs, supra note 69, § 57.3, Form 1, CI.2(a),
Form 2 C1.2(b), Form 6, Cl.12(d), Form 8, CI.8(a), Form 9, CI.2, Form 11, Cl.14(h),
Form 12, C1.9, Form 13, CI.8(h), Form 14, CI.7(g), Form 15, Cl.1(a), and Form
17, C.2(d).
299. See infra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.
300. While a negative pledge is available to the prior lender in order to
establish a default by debtor, such a provision does not affect the priority which
may be obtained by the purchase money financier. UCC § 9-312 (1987). Still, it is
unlikely that a creditor will enter into a purchase money arrangement with knowledge
that such action by the debtor will place the debtor in immediate default.
301. See supra note 298.
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At this point, the purpose of the notice has been satisfied and the
Bank can now eliminate this bulk of Borrower's inventory, i.e., all
belts and hoses manufactured by X Corp., from its lending base.
30 2
Presumably, the collateral as to which Bank retains priority is suf-
ficient in Bank's judgment to adequately secure the outstanding
indebtedness to Bank. As Borrower sells existing inventories, Bor-
rower will decrease the outstanding debt to Bank in the ordinary
course of business.303 Any new advances by Bank will be made only
on the basis of collateral available to Bank, i.e., inventory other
than belts and hoses manufactured by X Corp., receivables and
equipment. It therefore appears that Bank has in no way been harmed
by the presence on the scene of the Supplier.3°4
Indeed, it is likely that Bank has potentially benefitted by Sup-
plier's presence. Recall that, for any number of valid reasons, Bank
was unwilling to take the additional risk of expanding the credit
available to Borrower.3 °5 Accordingly, what Bank considers to be
risky credit has been made available by another party. If Bank is
correct and the additional credit causes Borrower to become finan-
cially embarrassed, Bank's money is not at risk and it remains secured
by the collateral (presumably sufficient in Bank's judgment), both
existing and after-acquired, other than X Corp. belts and hoses. On
the other hand if the new credit results in expansion of Borrower's
business, then all creditors of Borrower, including Bank, benefit by
the augmented estate of Borrower.
The problem in this scenario involves exactly what Borrower is
capable of offering Supplier by way of security. If, as Southtrust'
6
would require, Supplier must be able to demonstrate a one-to-one
correlation between the collateral as to which it claims a priority,
and the indebtedness to be secured, the transaction cannot operate
to fully protect Supplier in a commercially reasonable manner. If,
302. UCC § 9-312, comment 3. Professor Gilmore has posited a situation in
which the purchase money financier and the prior lender (which also has advanced
funds on new inventory) engage in a battle of notices, each trying to obtain the
right to finance debtor's inventory and obtain priority. In such a circumstance (that
is, where the prior financier desires to continue funding the incoming inventory of
debtor), Professor Gilmore's advice is sound. "In such a situation, A and B, ...
will be well advised to sit down together and come to an agreement: .... If, in
defiance of common sense, they engage in a battle of notifications, they should
both be hung. It is not worth anyone's time to try and figure out the priorities
between them." Gilmore, supra note 21, at 790.
303. This is nothing more than the continuation of loan repayment in the
ordinary course of business which presumably was occurring prior to Supplier's
presence on the scene. Monitoring will continue by Bank in this regard to assure
repayment as it did before.
304. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 283.
306. 760 F.2d 1240.
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as hypothesized, 0 the nature of the goods do not permit the utili-
zation of "release prices,"30 8 Supplier will be required to receive
frequent itemized reports of sales of the collateral from Borrower. °9
Such reports must be accompanied by set payments on the debt
related to the amounts of inventory reported as sold. As an initial
proposition such detailed reporting is certainly burdensome. While
such reporting may be required by Supplier as a matter of business
monitoring, as a legal requirement it does not simplify, modernize
or foster the development of commerce as intended by the Code. 10
Of greater impact to Borrower's and Supplier's relationship is
the problem associated with on-going shipments. Suppose that Sup-
plier requires monthly reports, with daily itemization of sales, and
corresponding remittances as a matter of business monitoring. At a
point, when, for example, sixty percent of the first shipment of
goods is sold, Borrower places a new order with Supplier to replenish
its inventory of X Corp. belts and hoses. Between Borrower and
Supplier there now exist two groups of inventory, together with the
separate debts incurred to acquire each group. Upon the sale of
inventory following the second shipment, the question becomes which
inventory was sold, and hence, which indebtedness was repaid. Were
the sales of hoses and belts from shipment number one or shipment
number two? Due to the fungible nature of the goods, it would be
impossible to determine whether the goods sold were from shipment
one or shipment two.
It may be suggested that an allocation formula set forth in
Supplier's security agreement could provide that payments received
are applied to reduce the debt related to items sold. It may be
possible to convince a court that such an allocation preserves a one-
to-one relationship between existing inventories and outstanding debt,
but such is not a certain result. 1 In any event, given the fungible
nature of the collateral, the purchase money financier will be unable,
at any time, to allocate payments to specific items of collateral.
Furthermore, in the event that Borrower mistakenly omits sales of
inventory or fraudulently reports fewer sales, the tracing problems
between the two shipments and the corresponding debts become
307. Id.
308. These are specific amounts to be paid upon the sale of discrete items of
inventory, in order to reduce the outstanding debt owing to the purchase money
financier incurred to acquire that specific inventory.
309. Reports may be daily, weekly or monthly, depending on the debtor's and
financier's needs and the rapidity of debtor's inventory turnover.
310. UCC § 1-102(2) (1987).
311. If there is any discrepancy between the amount of debt outstanding and
the amount of inventory left on the floor, the purchase money financier will have
difficulty demonstrating what debt was paid off and what collateral was effectively
released. See Lloyd, supra note 44.
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virtually insurmountable. The result is a loss of all priority in all of
the existing purchase money collateral. The only solution for Supplier
is to ship one shipment at a time. That is, until the full indebtedness
of the first shipment is satisfied and all of the original inventory is
sold, Supplier cannot make a second shipment for fear of commin-
gling.
3 12
As Professor Scott has demonstrated, a significant characteristic
of secured lending is the relational aspect between debtor and secured
party. 313 The ability to exercise control over the debtor's business
plan and development, the reduced amount of monitoring required
where all collateral of a particular type is "tied up," and the ability
to develop an on-going financing arrangement with a minimum of
documentation and legal technicality allow the financier and debtor
to develop the business in a commercial rather than a legal context.
Such a relational model applies as well to the purchase money
financier of inventory. The financing by Supplier, by the nature of
the inventory, involves a fluid asset of Borrower.31 4 To keep Borrow-
er's business operating, Borrower must constantly replenish sold
inventory, decrease outstanding indebtedness, and incur new obliga-
tions for new inventory. If purchase money financing of inventory
is to be a realistic alternative to Borrower, it must be permitted to
operate in an on-going, continuous fashion. Limiting purchase money
inventory financing to a "one-shot," shipment by shipment method
will make it economically burdensome, if not impossible, and gen-
erally make it so unfeasible as to cease as a workable alternative for
the Borrower.
The solution is to permit Supplier to retain priority with respect
to all collateral (X Corp. belts and hoses) that Supplier can identify
as having been provided/financed by Supplier, as security for all
indebtedness that Supplier proves was advanced to and incurred by
Borrower to acquire such collateral. This "pooling" concept will
allow Supplier, with a modest amount of monitoring, to maintain
priority as to all collateral provided, to secure all debt provided for
such acquisition. At the same time, the removal of the one-to-one
correlation requirement will permit Supplier to meet this burden of
tracing, but will not in any way harm Bank.
As noted, the drafters assumed that upon receipt of a notice of
purchase money priority by Bank, the Bank will cease making ad-
312. Even such an arrangement may not work. If the single shipment involves
numerous items, a strict view of the tracing of debt and collateral may require that
the debt for the shipment be itemized in terms of the number of items contained
in the shipment. If this is the case, then tracing within a shipment would also pose
an insurmountable obstacle to the maintenance of priority. This is the "what unit
applies" problem mentioned before. See supra note 79.
313. Scott, supra note 2, and Part V. C.
314. See supra note 83.
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vances against the types of inventory collateral described in the notice
(X Corp. belts and hoses). While this may appear to result in a loss
of collateral to Bank, in actuality it does not. Supplier cannot
"prime" Bank's interest in any existing inventory. It is only existing
inventory as to which Bank relied in making advances to Borrower.
The collateral with which Bank intended to secure its loans to
Borrower is still very much intact. Bank will make no new advances
against incoming inventory of the type claimed by Supplier and, in
addition, Bank will have the benefit of accounts receivable generated
upon the sale of the new inventory. Although it is likely that Bank
will have an obligation to advance against these new receivables, its
priority as to same is unaffected by Supplier's interest in the inventory
collateral." 5 In the context of a term loan by a general financier, the
general financier has not lost any collateral as to which it was entitled
to rely (after-acquired inventory)31 6 and indeed, the general financier
receives the additional collateral of receivables generated by the new
inventory.
In the event that Borrower defaults and is unable to pay either
lender, the presence of Supplier can only benefit the Bank. In the
event that Borrower's existing assets are insufficient to satisfy the
indebtedness owing to both lenders, each lender will have a portion
of Borrower's assets available to it. Bank will have that collateral
that would have been available to it regardless of Supplier's presence.
That is, but for Supplier's presence, Borrower would not have any
X Corp. belts and hoses in its inventory. This is so because Bank
had refused to either finance this portion of inventory or Borrower
would not have acquired the inventory as the cost of Bank's financing
was excessive.317 If the assets other than X Corp. belts and hoses are
insufficient to satisfy Bank's indebtedness, the result stems not from
Supplier's participation, but from the market, Bank's miscalculation
of values, lack of diligence, or other cause. At the same time, if the
inventory of X Corp. auto parts is insufficient to satisfy Supplier,
Supplier has no recourse to other assets until Bank has been satisfied
in full. However, in the event that Supplier can be made whole by
liquidating less than all of the X Corp. inventory, the excess redounds
to the benefit of Bank and may be applied to satisfy Bank's indebt-
edness.
Under the restricted interpretation of the PMSI in inventory, the
general financier receives a windfall at the unjustified expense of the
purchase money financier. While it certainly is reasonable to require
the purchase money financier to identify that collateral which was
315. UCC § 9-312(3) and comment 3 (1987).
316. See purpose of purchase money priority supra note 186, which was to
favor the new value lender.
317. See supra note 32-34 and accompanying text.
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acquired by the debtor with advances or other value provided by the
purchase money financier and to prove the amount of indebtedness
advanced for the purpose of acquiring such inventory, it is unrea-
sonable to require a direct one-to-one relationship between particular
items of collateral and specific amounts of outstanding indebtedness.
VII. CONCLUSION
From the very earliest drafts of Article 9, the drafters established
the preference for new value, purchase money interests. This pref-
erence logically resulted from the common-law development of pur-
chase money priority. The preference evolved as a matter of equity
and justice following the validation of the floating lien. On the other
hand, the drafters validated the floating lien, not as a matter of
policy, but rather because the creative minds of lawyers had made
the floating lien a fait accompli, though at excessive cost and com-
plexity. The formulation of a unified, simpler financing system made
validation of the floating lien a necessity. The contrast between the
reasons for the preference given to the purchase money interest and
the reasons for validation of the floating lien requires that the former
be entitled to the benefits of the latter, at least in the context of
inventory financing. Without the floating lien, all inventory financing
is made costly, difficult and fraught with risk. Inventory financing,
however, becomes workable with the floating lien. Once a creditor
obtains a floating lien on the debtor's inventory, the PMSI provides
the only alternative available to the debtor to finance new lines of
inventory. In that regard, the purchase money priority becomes
meaningless unless it too can benefit from the floating lien. By
allowing the purchase money financier to utilize the floating lien, the
financier can pool all purchase money collateral as security for all
purchase money obligations and provide a workable alternative for
the borrower confronted with an existing financier with a blanket
lien. At the same time the floating lien general financier can protect
its interest and, with proper diligence, will not be prejudiced by the
existence of the purchase money party. There is nothing inconsistent
between the PMSI in inventory and the floating lien. Indeed, no two
provisions could be more consistent and complimentary.
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